


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IMAGES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND VIETNAM: THE RELATIONSHIP  
OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND POLITICAL CYNICISM

by

Katherine B. Pershern

A Thesis

Submitted to the

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the Graduate School of the University

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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION

...churches may be effectively relevant to ethical reflection in respect to American foreign policy and international phenomena generally and exert significant impacts on the thinking of their own members, on the body politic generally, and on the policy making process generally.<sup>1</sup>

This quote illustrates the importance of studying religious affiliation groups and to explore their impact on the thinking of their own members on foreign policy issues. It is this type of study that will be the main concern of this paper. More specifically, the first problem will be to explore the relationship between religious affiliation groups and their action oriented images of the Middle East and Vietnam conflicts. The study will then be taken one step further in order to ascertain the impact of political cynicism on such a relationship. Political cynicism has been shown to have a definite impact on one's thinking in public opinion studies. It is then important to determine if political cynicism, rather than religion, has more of an influence on one's action oriented images of the Middle East and Vietnam conflicts. This particular study is important, then, for several reasons.

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<sup>1</sup>Alfred O. Hero, Jr., American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1973), p. 274.

### Justification

The subject of a person's images has become an important focal point for study in foreign affairs. It is important because the way in which a person views a situation has been found to have a definite impact on how he views the situation in the future and, for the purposes of this paper, how he reacts towards it. This makes it important to explore the nature of images in order to gain a better understanding of them and thus helping to understand the role of public opinion in foreign policy making.

There are actually two types of images that are present in each nation. The first are those images held by elites. These images are the most important because they are those images held by people who have a direct influence on the making of foreign policy. The second type of images are also important in their own way. These are the non-elite images or those of people who do not have a direct influence on policy making. These people may have a good knowledge of foreign affairs or they may not, but in reality, they have little opportunity to influence actual foreign policy making. Although they have no direct or measurable effect upon the resulting policy, non-elite images can be an input source for the elites and thus, may have some influence on those images held by the elites. One concern of this paper is to examine the non-elite images of religious groups.

The question may arise as to the purpose of studying the relationship of religious affiliation groups to images. Alfred O. Hero, in his book American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy,

found that the potential impacts of religious institutions on the thought and action of Americans with respect to world affairs, and ultimately on American foreign policy, remain substantial. Both legally and in practical political terms, the churches have more latitude than most other tax-exempt voluntary institutions to take part in the controversial political processes involved in foreign policy making.<sup>2</sup> Many of the elites such as presidents, cabinet members, senators and congressmen, who have a direct impact on foreign policy making are involved in a religious institution to one degree or another. The fact that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was a member of the Jewish faith was at one time a concern to many people for fear he would not be able to deal with the Middle East situation objectively. More and more theologians, ethicists, and other intellectuals and leaders connected with the mainline Protestant churches have studied, discussed and written about implications of religious faith and ethics for international issues. All major Protestant denominations have issued a number of public statements on international issues. The Catholics, although less articulate, have also issued their share of pronouncements on such matters. Public statements on international issues have been issued by Jewish groups as well.<sup>3</sup> The three groups chosen for this study are Catholic, Episcopalian and Jewish. These are a sampling of some of the groups studied by Hero.

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. i.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. i-ii.

A study that includes an examination of the impact of political cynicism on the relationship of religious affiliation and images of the Middle East and Vietnam is also important. It is important because one's feeling of political alienation or cynicism might have a definite influence on what a person feels should be done about foreign policy issues. Just what influence this feeling of incapability or discontentment might have on images will be discussed later in this chapter.

Several well-known scholars have found public opinion studies, such as the one examined in this paper, to be very important in the study of foreign policy behavior. Herbert C. Kelman wrote:

Public opinion research has a great deal of relevance to the study of international behavior, provided deliberate attention is paid to the way in which public opinion affects the formulation and conduct of foreign policy....Studies on the distribution of attitudes toward foreign policy issues in the population can be useful insofar as they give an indication of general moods that decision makers are likely to take into account.<sup>4</sup>

It is believed that this paper will study such a distribution of attitudes. Attention will also be paid to the way in which the opinion of the religious groups could affect foreign policy, by examining how the groups attempt to communicate their images. In yet another article Kelman wrote:

The specific usefulness of public opinion research depends on one's view of the role of public opinion in the foreign policy process--but even those analysts who assign a minimal role to public opinion

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<sup>4</sup>Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope," in International Behavior, ed. by Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 14.

are likely to agree that public conceptions or reactions are part of the context within which foreign policy is carried out and that an understanding of these factors, therefore, is essential to mapping out the background for international relations.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, another author who views public opinion as important is

James N. Rosenau. He wrote:

Domestic sources of foreign policy never before seemed so important especially because of the controversy over Vietnam....Foreign policy has become more than simply responses to international stimuli.... Although secondary, domestic forces at work within a society can contribute to the quality and contents of its external behavior.<sup>6</sup>

The following section will be concerned with an examination of some of the concepts employed by this paper and what previous research has been conducted on this or related subjects.

#### Review of Concepts, Literature and Findings

There have been many definitions and interpretations of images, so an attempt to describe the most well-known of these will be made in order that a workable definition for the purposes of this study may be found. Perhaps the most basic discussion on images was made by Kenneth E. Boulding in his book The Image. Boulding sees an image of the world as also one's knowledge of the world. This knowledge is usually found to be subjective or what is believed to be true rather than real or objective knowledge. Images are

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<sup>5</sup>Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches: the Question of Relevance," in International Behavior, ed. by Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). p. 566.

<sup>6</sup>James N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 2.

built up as a result of all the past experiences of the possessor of the image. Whether they be individually or group oriented, images consist not only of images of "facts" but also images of "value." The "value" images are concerned with the rating of various parts of one's images of the world according to some scale of better or worseness. The end result then is that there are no such things as "facts" for these are only messages filtered through a changeable value system. Favorable messages are found to be received and accepted easily for they may have an effect of increasing the stability of images or resistance to unfavorable images. The meaning of the message, then, is the change which it produces in the image. Boulding goes on to say that it is this image of the world that largely governs behavior.<sup>7</sup> In a later article he wrote that "people do not respond to the objective facts of the situation, but to their image of the situation--what they think the world is like."<sup>8</sup> He also recognized national images of two groups. First, there were the images of the small or elite group who make decisions and secondly, those of the masses whose tacit support is of vital importance. Their images cannot diverge too much without the elite losing some of their power.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956) pp. 5-14.

<sup>8</sup>Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969) p. 423.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 423.



Ole Holsti's comments were much in agreement with those of Boulding, but he placed emphasis on the fact that images are dependent on the belief system or perception of reality. This belief system is made up of images of the past, present, and future and includes all the accumulated and organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and the world. The function of the belief system then, is the establishment of goals and the ordering of preferences.<sup>10</sup>

In the book, The Functioning of the International System, Andrew M. Scott views an image as the result of the interaction of the flow of signals to the image holder from his environment and of his response to those signals. He thought of it as the totality of the attributes, whether real or imagined, that an individual perceives in an object or situation. It may have been formed on the basis of the current norms of a society, on the basis of secondary experiences, and on the basis of immediate personal knowledge. The image shaping sources to which a person has access depends on his position and role in the decision making process. These sources may strengthen, weaken, alter, clarify or even reorganize his image. Once the image has taken form, it becomes part of the person's perceptual apparatus and shapes the perception of new signals. Scott classifies obstacles to accurate perception of the following three categories: (1) subjective

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<sup>10</sup>Ole Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969) p. 544.

factors such as personal characteristics; (2) general cultural factors as prevailing stereotypes concerning a nation and its position in the world; (3) institutional and communication factors such as attitudes and values inculcated by the organization and the effects of the flow of information and opinion. These obstacles may interact with each other in many different ways during the formation of the image.<sup>11</sup>

K. J. Holsti sees that one way to account for specific foreign policy objectives is to emphasize the perceptions, images, attitudes, values and beliefs of those responsible for the policy. He believes that man acts and reacts according to his image of the environment. It is thus not the state of the environment that matters as much as what the people believe that state to be. Such an image is formed by the three stages of: (1) the individual's perception of an object, fact or condition; (2) his evaluation of that object, fact, or condition in terms of its goodness or badness or friendliness and hostility; (3) the meaning ascribed to or deduced from that object, fact, or condition. Partly because of impediments to the flow of information and also distortion caused by values and attitudes of the individuals, Holsti feels images will always be different from reality. The values and attitudes are usually the result of upbringing and socialization in various groups.<sup>12</sup> Holsti also found that the relationship between the public and the government

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<sup>11</sup> Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International System (New York: MacMillan Company, 1967) pp. 47-9.

<sup>12</sup> K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1967), pp. 156-8.

in democratic societies involves complex interaction in which officials and the public, or its component groups, react to each others' images, behavior, values, and interests. The Vietnam conflict brought increased attention to the public, thus making their images more important.<sup>13</sup>

William A. Scott posits that an image of a nation (or any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation. The image may, however, have three analytically distinct aspects. The first is cognitive attributes. This is the way in which a person understands the object in an intellectual way and his view of the object's "inherent" characteristics which he regards as independent of his own response to them. The second aspect of an image is the affective component. This represents a liking or disliking for the focal object and is usually associated with perceived attributes that the person either approves or disapproves. Finally, there is the action component which consists of a set of responses to the object that the person deems appropriate in the light of its perceived attributes. In other words, the actions of policies towards the object that the person deems appropriate. Scott felt these aspects might be hard to separate empirically in most instances. Beliefs about nations, feelings toward them, and notions of what ought to be done in relation to them are probably closely intertwined, but he felt by posing questions in a particular way, the

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 180.



components could be isolated for study.<sup>14</sup> Scott also found that in a number of studies there was support for his notion that benign images of the world and a desire for cooperative involvement in it will more frequently be found among the well-informed population than among the poorly informed.<sup>15</sup> This may also be found in this paper because the majority of the people are well-informed. (The reasons for this assumption will be presented later in the chapter.) Yet another of Scott's conclusions, that may be relevant to this paper, was that the more contact one has with a group, the more clear one's image of it becomes.<sup>16</sup> This may be applicable to the Jewish group.

From the preceding definitions and interpretations of images, the workable definition used for this paper will be that images consist of essentially two components; the perception and the action components. The first is concerned with how a person sees a situation or object in terms of his personal values and attitudes about it. The action component is concerned with how the image causes a person to react or, as in the case of this paper, what policy would one want to follow in light of his image of the situation. This study will be concerned with the action orientation of images of the Middle East and Vietnam, for it is these images that may determine how these people might wish to influence the present policy.

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<sup>14</sup>William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," in International Behavior ed. by Herbert Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966) p. 72.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

Milton Rosenberg found that images are influenced by the broad collectives that are organized around commonalities of religious affiliation, economic interest, ethnic sources, racial origin, regional location or social-educational units. These units have what might be termed attitude-prescribing power. Their members are bound to one another by the real interests they share and also by the symbolic usages that define and extend those interests. Their normative and value oriented patterns are guided by such groupings.<sup>17</sup> One of the main concerns of this paper is to discern the difference in the images of the three religious affiliation groups. The characteristics which would place these people in other groups mentioned by Rosenberg were essentially the same in each religious group studied. (This will be discussed later in the chapter.) It will now be necessary to review some of the concepts on religion and some of the existing literature on religious affiliation groups.

It has already been established that the study of religious affiliation groups in relation to foreign policy can be important. This section will briefly discuss the three religious groups and some previous findings on their relationship to foreign policy. The Denominational Society by Andrew M. Greeley makes it clear that although the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious groups are fully American with great similarities in their organizational

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<sup>17</sup>Milton Rosenberg, "Images in Relation to the Policy Process: American Public Opinion on Cold War Issues," in International Behavior ed. by Herbert Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966) p. 299.

structure and in the behavior of their religious functionaries, the American culture is not making the three groups indistinguishable from one another. They have different histories, traditions, and experiences in this country.<sup>18</sup>

The American Protestant grouping is quite different from the other two because Protestantism is a collection of denominations, although it is, in the most general sense of the word, the principal American church. As the majority religion, it comes closest to being established which makes it easier to become an American cultural religion.<sup>19</sup> The Protestant group studied in this paper will be the members of the Episcopal church. In one study it was found that Episcopalians did not differ significantly from other Protestant groups.<sup>20</sup> As far as the Roman Catholic group is concerned, they have a far greater sense of belonging and loyalty to the prescribed activities of the church than do many of the Protestants and Jews. Although this has lessened a great deal in recent times, there is still a fairly strong sense of loyalty remaining.<sup>21</sup> The Jewish group is distinctive in that they present special problems of identification. The term Jew has an ethnic as well as a religious connotation. The Jewish group in several studies was found to be even less church oriented than the Protestant

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<sup>18</sup> Andrew M. Greeley, The Denominational Society, (Glennville, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972) pp. 203-4.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>20</sup> Hero, American Religious groups, p. 175.

<sup>21</sup> Greeley, The Denominational Society, pp. 191-202.

group.<sup>22</sup> The following will present some findings on the relationship of religion and foreign policy.

Several studies on the relationship of religion to foreign affairs will be discussed. The first to be examined was in Gerhard Lenski's book, The Religious Factor. In general, he found that the differences between Catholics, Protestants and Jews were minor with respect to the area of foreign policy. Only in the case of the Jewish group being more likely than the others to endorse the United Nations and the idea of world government was any real difference found. The Jewish tendency toward internationalism is understandable because, as Lenski relates it, "as victims of nationalistic enthusiasm in countless countries for centuries, Jews have naturally developed a distrust of nationalism and have come to pin their faith on international institutions as the only practical alternative."

Milton Rosenberg also found, in 1963, a tendency toward internationalism by the Jewish group, but he also found that Jewish respondents were somewhat more rejecting of "hardline" foreign policy positions than either the Protestant or Catholic groups. The Jews were also the most oriented toward political rather than military action for peace, while the Catholics were the least oriented in this manner. The Catholics, at this time, seemed to have sought ways of identifying themselves with what they took to be national ideology and the patriotic cause of vigilant defense

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<sup>22</sup>Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1963) pp. 158-9.

combined with the strong anti-communist indoctrination of the Catholic church.<sup>23</sup>

A major study of religious groups and foreign policy was conducted by Alfred O. Hero Jr. and it extended over a period of years. This enabled him to determine if any changes in the orientation of the groups took place. It was found generally that the Jews differed notably from the others on most international questions. The Jews were also found to be the most aware of international developments.<sup>24</sup> Although the Catholics were the most isolationist, this decreased somewhat after World War II. They were less knowledgeable about foreign affairs and aware of international developments than the Protestants.<sup>25</sup> When asked questions specifically concerned with Vietnam up until 1967, the Jews were found to be more opposed to United States military intervention, more in favor of de-escalation and more supportive of co-operation with international bodies than the other two groups in order to solve the Vietnam conflict. Catholics were found to be at least as supportive as the Protestants of military intervention and they were also just as apt to feel that it had not been a mistake to become involved. They felt that the United States should be willing to intervene again should a similar situation develop elsewhere. After 1967, however, there were more conciliatory views among the Catholics than the

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<sup>23</sup>Rosenberg, "Images and Policy Process," pp. 308-12.

<sup>24</sup>Hero, American Religious Groups, pp. 11-3.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 31.



Protestants, who felt the United States should persist in its endeavors in Vietnam and perhaps even expand them. The Catholics thus became more willing to search for a solution through multilateral means.<sup>26</sup>

Hero also found that the two Christian groups did not differ in any consistent way in their thinking about Israel and related aspects of Middle Eastern affairs from World War II to June, 1967. The Protestants seemed slightly more inclined to send United States troops as long as they were part of a United Nations force to keep peace. The Catholics were more inclined than the Protestants to send troops to Israel even if they were not a part of a United Nations peace-keeping force. After 1968, the Catholics showed only a slight number of its group willing to send troops. Jews were of course, much more pro-Israeli than the other two groups. Overwhelming majorities of the Jews favored active United States support of Israel even if it meant going so far as sending arms and troops to Israel's aid.<sup>27</sup> In general, however, it was again found that Jews were more liberal and more international in their outlook. This may be because Jews know relatives in a wider diversity of foreign cultures than most other American ethnic and religious groups. They maintain their concern for and emotional involvement with the security of their ethnic and religious counterparts abroad.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 52-4.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 77-8.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 201-3.

Yet another concept to be discussed is that of political alienation. According to Marvin E. Olsen, there are two categories of political alienation. They are those who have a feeling of incapability and those whose feeling is more of a discontentment with the system. If a person falls into the incapability category, it is usually because he feels incapable of participating effectively on account of the nature of his social environment. This could also be termed as a low feeling of efficacy. In this case, alienation is involuntarily imposed on the individual by the social system. The affective tone, as a result, is a feeling of despair because of a sense of guidelessness or ignorance of the appropriate action to take. He desires goals but really does not know how to achieve them. There is also present a feeling of powerlessness and meaninglessness. The category of discontentment is different in that, because of the very nature of the social world, the individual does not feel it is worth participating in. Another term for this would be political cynicism. In this case, alienation is voluntarily chosen characterized by a feeling of disgust. Feelings of dissimilarity, dissatisfaction and disillusionment contribute to this disgust.<sup>29</sup>

These two categories provide the basis for political efficacy and cynicism scales in public opinion studies. From analysis, Olsen found that these two scales are partially inter-related although they do represent relatively distinct categories of

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<sup>29</sup> Marvin E. Olsen, "Two Categories of Political Alienation," Social Forces, XLVII (March, 1969), 291-2.

estranged attitudes. Those people with a feeling of incapability were found more among the poorly educated, elderly, manual or clerical workers, low income groups and females than were those who were discontented. Both categories were found to have low levels of participation, while the discontented category being even less inclined to do so.<sup>30</sup>

Because it has been found that attitudes of political cynicism and efficacy are somewhat inter-related and with both of these apparent in this study, it is important to review some of Harlan Hahn's conclusions. Efficacy, or the perception of personal effectiveness, has been a popular concept in political behavior research, while much less research has been undertaken concerning the association between efficacy and foreign policy issues.<sup>31</sup> The results of a survey conducted by Hahn showed the effects of efficacy on various foreign policy questions. His findings were that highly efficacious respondents were more likely to show feelings of pacifism and a desire for international co-operation by peaceful means such as disarmament. When questions concerning conflict situations such as Vietnam were asked, it was found that people with a sense of political effectiveness were also more likely to favor aggressive military action than persons with weak feelings of efficacy. The varied responses for those with strong feelings of

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 293-4.

<sup>31</sup>Harlan Hahn, "Political Efficacy and Foreign Policy Attitudes," Social Problems, XVII No. 2 (Fall, 1969), 271.

efficacy may simply show personal confidence in the ability of their country to maintain its influence in either a peaceful or a warring international environment. Respondents with a high degree of efficacy also showed satisfaction with their own political influence, with the responsibilities delegated to government leaders, and with the policies adopted by those officials, while those with a low sense of efficacy desired a greater voice.<sup>32</sup> These findings may or may not be supported by the findings presented in this paper when the impact of political cynicism is studied.

### Research Questions

There are essentially five research questions which this study will examine. They are:

- (1) What is the relationship between religious affiliation groups and their action oriented images of the Middle East conflict?
- (2) How do the religious groups attempt to communicate their action oriented images of the Middle East?
- (3) What is the relationship between religious affiliation groups and their action oriented images of the Vietnam conflict?
- (4) How do the religious groups attempt to communicate their action oriented images of Vietnam?
- (5) What is the impact of political cynicism on the above relationships?

The first and the third of the basic research questions are concerned with examining the action oriented images of the three religious groups toward the Middle East and Vietnam conflict

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp. 277-8.

situations. In both of these areas there was an armed conflict situation. They were different in that the United States had directly committed itself with American men and arms in the case of Vietnam, while it had not done so in the Middle East. It is expected that there will be little difference in the images of Vietnam because Americans are more closely involved. When considering the Middle East, it is felt that the Jewish group will show some difference when compared to the other groups. The Middle East conflict involves Israel, a country which because of the Jewish religion, should extract more support for its causes from the Jewish group.

More specifically, the study will attempt to tap and explore various indicators of the individual's action oriented images toward the two areas. The indicators will include specific policy alternatives and then general questions asking the respondents if they feel the present level of support in each of the two areas should be increased or decreased. The Jewish group should be more willing to see the United States become more involved in the Middle East than would the Catholic and Episcopalian groups. In order to determine the extent to which the groups attempt to communicate these images or influence policy, questions dealing with several methods of communication were included. Again it is assumed there will be little, if any, difference between the three groups in respect to Vietnam, but in the case of the Middle East questions, the Jewish group should be more prone to communicate their images. The second basic research question will be to determine if there

is an impact of political cynicism upon the relationship of religious affiliation and action oriented images of the Middle East and Vietnam. It is assumed there will be little or no impact of political cynicism on the relationships.

### Methodology

The best method for determining the images of non-elites is through the use of a survey so that the images of a large number of individuals may be examined. The selection of the type of survey technique is usually dependent on several factors: cost, completion time, response rate and response bias. There are essentially two techniques from which to choose. The first being the use of interviews. This type usually requires a great deal more expense, both as far as time and money are concerned. The response rate in general is higher, but in regard to response bias, some evidence suggests that mail questionnaires possibly have better results.<sup>33</sup> The second method involves the distribution of a questionnaire to a group, either in person or through the mail. Given the limitations of time and funds, the latter method was chosen. Since the groups to be studied were religious affiliation groups, they were quite sensitive about remaining anonymous and it was hoped that this survey method would make the respondents feel they were remaining so. There is the problem, however, with a survey conducted in this manner because of low response rate. This was hoped to be alleviated, in part, by the use of a follow-up letter when the questionnaire

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<sup>33</sup>Frederick Wiseman, "Methodological Bias in Public Opinion Surveys," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXVI No. 1 (Spring, 1972) pp. 278-9.

was mailed and by a speech emphasizing the importance of responding when the questionnaire was distributed. It was also made known that a contribution would be made to the respective groups for each response received. This was used as an added incentive. The questionnaire was distributed to members of a Roman Catholic and Episcopalian parish, and a Jewish synagogue in suburban Denver, Colorado. The particular parishes and synagogue were chosen because of contacts with individuals in each group who were willing to give assistance in the research.

The same questionnaires were distributed to each group during the two weeks following the Munich incident in September, 1972 which involved the deaths of members of the Israeli Olympic team by members of the Arab Black September terrorist organization. The sampling was random in the Catholic group where a mailing list was obtained through the PTA of the Catholic school associated with the parish. Because no names could be obtained from the other two groups, a purposive rather than a random sample was utilized. The questionnaires were distributed to an Episcopalian church service on a Sunday morning. Some of the Jewish questionnaires were distributed at a night church meeting, but so few members were present that the remainder of the questionnaires were mailed for us by a member of the synagogue. The response rate is presented in Table 1-1 on the next page.

TABLE 1-1: RESPONSE RATE OF THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS

	#RTRND	#SENT	%
Catholic	78	176	44%
Episcopalian	79	110	72%
Jewish	81	122	66%

The response rate was sufficiently high to give an indication of the feelings of each group.

The questionnaire (see Appendix) was composed of various demographic variables such as age, sex, income, education and political party affiliation. Questions including voting behavior and interest in international affairs were also included. The rest of the questionnaire was composed of indicators of the respondents' feelings and images of the Middle East and Vietnam and the manner in which they attempted to communicate their images. The Vietnam questions were taken mainly from the Almond, Verba, et. al. study.<sup>34</sup> The questions on the Middle East were composed for this study and pre-tested on a Jewish group in 1971.

From the information provided by demographic characteristics of the sample, it was found that there were approximately the same number of males as females and that they were mostly middle-aged, well-educated, middle to upper-middle class and most expressed

<sup>34</sup> Sidney Verba, et. al., "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," American Political Science Review, LXI No. 2 (June, 1967) pp. 317-33.



considerable interest in foreign policy. (Social class was determined primarily by income.) This would make the majority of the respondents a part of the "attentive" public as opposed to the "mass" public.<sup>35</sup>

The plan of analysis will focus on the distribution of responses for each religious group. This will be accomplished through cross-tabulations of attitudinal questions by religious affiliation and the presentation of contingency tables. Percentage figures and the chi square ( $X^2$ ) test of significance will be utilized in the discussion and interpretation of the findings. The .05 level of significance is the minimum level that will be accepted as representing a significant difference. When a chi square is significant to a higher level it will be indicated. Factor analysis was also employed to determine which attitudinal items could justifiably be identified as multi-dimensional scales.

Any conclusions made from the findings cannot be taken to infer that these findings are representative of the entire population of the United States. Indeed, very little can be inferred from such a small sample, but it is assumed that this group of respondents may have many similarities with other groups which have similar socio-economic background found elsewhere in the United States. Any study which will give some additional information on non-elite images will add to a greater understanding of the role of public opinion in foreign policy making.

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<sup>35</sup>James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, Inc., 1961) p. 33.

With the background presented in this introductory chapter, it will now be necessary to examine the findings. The second chapter will be concerned with the first two research questions. That is, it will explore the relationship of religious affiliation and action oriented images of the Middle East and, then, the communication of these images. The third chapter will be concerned with essentially the same questions only this time, they will be concerned with Vietnam. The fourth chapter will examine the impact of political cynicism on the relationships established in the second and third chapters. Finally in the fifth chapter, comparisons and conclusions will be presented based on the findings presented in the preceding chapters.

## CHAPTER II

### ACTION ORIENTED IMAGES OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The first part of this chapter will examine the data to determine if any relationship exists between images of the Middle East conflict and religious affiliation. The action component of the respondents' images, or the policies that the person deems appropriate, will be separated to some extent from their images as a whole. The action oriented images of the Episcopalians, Catholics and Jews will be indicated by the following means: (1) single attitudinal questions; (2) an assistance to Israel scale; (3) and a question dealing with the present level of United States support to Israel. Finally, the amount and manner in which the respondents attempt to communicate their images will be examined in order to determine the impact or potential impact their images will have on policy making.

#### Single Question Indicators

The single attitudinal question asked the respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: (1) The United States should terminate diplomatic contact with the Arab states given Arab policies toward Israel. (2) The United States should seek negotiations between the Arab states, Israel, the USSR, and itself to work out a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. (3) The United States should not provide further military assistance

to the Jordanian government. (4) The United States should engage in more dialogue with the Arab states. My basic expectation, as stated in the introduction, was that there would be a significant difference between the religious groups and their attitudes concerning these questions. The Jewish respondents should give responses that are more in favor of Israel. In regard to the first question, it is therefore assumed that the Jewish group will be significantly more willing to terminate diplomatic contact with the Arab states given Arab policies toward Israel. The following table presents the findings on this point.

TABLE 2-1: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND TERMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH THE ARAB STATES

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Disagree	62%	63%	63%
Undecided	20	28	10
Agree	<u>18</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>27</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(74)	(75)	(79)
$\chi^2 = 12.80$ $df = 4$ Significance $p \leq .02$			

The chi square test indicates that there is a significant difference between the religious groups. The Jewish group shows a significantly higher percentage (27 percent) of its group willing to terminate diplomatic contact with the Arabs, as compared to 18 and 9 percent for the Catholic and Episcopalian groups respectively.

The higher percentage of the Jewish group was probably due to the religious ties of the Jewish people to the country of Israel. They might feel that Israel's relations with the United States might be aided by the termination of diplomatic contact with the Arab states or they may see this as a method of punishment against the Arabs. The difference between the Catholic and Episcopalian groups indicates that the Catholics do not have what would seem to be a more conciliatory attitude than the Episcopalians, which might have been expected according to Hero's post-1968 findings.

In the undecided category, the Episcopalian group has 28 percent, the Catholics have 20 percent and the Jewish group has only 10 percent of its group represented here. This, then, might be where the respondents' religious affiliation might have actually made the difference. Apparently the Jewish religious ties with Israel influenced the Jewish people, who might have otherwise been undecided, to agree with the termination of diplomatic contact with the Arab states.

All three groups have about the same majority percentage of their respondents in the disagree category. This indicates that most of each group favors continued diplomatic contact with the Arabs. This majority would tend to uphold Scott's proposition that benign images of the world and a desire for more co-operation are frequently found in well-informed groups. Since it was determined in the introduction that all three religious groups are fairly interested, or members of the attentive public, the respondents might interpret continued dialogue with the Arabs as a method of continued international co-operation.

The second single indicator of the impact of religion on action oriented images of the Middle East is concerned with negotiations between the Arab states, Israel, the USSR and the United States to work out a peaceful solution to the conflict. It is again assumed that there will be a significant difference between the groups. It is also assumed that the Jewish group will be less willing to agree with negotiations because it might endanger her position in the land acquired from the Arabs in the Six-Day War of 1967. The relationship between religious affiliation and their position regarding negotiations is illustrated in Table 2-2.

TABLE 2-2: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND U.S. NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARABS, ISRAEL, USSR, TO WORK OUT PEACEFUL SOLUTION

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Disagree	25%	22%	35%
Undecided	12	17	11
Agree	<u>63</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>54</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(76)	(77)	(81)
$X^2 = 4.20$	df = 4	Not Significant	

In this question, the Jews have a higher percentage of 35 percent in the disagree category as compared to 25 percent of the Catholic and 22 percent of the Episcopal groups. There is less difference in the undecided category this time. A greater difference is seen in the agree category with 63 percent of the Catholics, 61 percent of the Episcopalians, and 54 percent of the Jews found here. This

indicates that more Jews than members of the other two groups, definitely feel that negotiations between the various parties should not be undertaken. Although more Jews, than other respondents, are found in a position favoring Israel, the difference between the three groups is not statistically significant.

The next single indicator deals with the termination of further military assistance to the Jordanian government. This question was included since Jordan is somewhat of a "moderate" actor in the conflict and it would hopefully give an indication as to how each group feels toward continuing military assistance to such states. The data in Table 2-3 will indicate whether the assumption that there will be a significant difference in the responses of the three religious groups is correct. It is also expected that the Jewish group would be more likely to agree with the termination of United States military assistance to Jordan.

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TABLE 2-3: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND U.S. TERMINATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Disagree	18%	27%	35%
Undecided	29	32	15
Agree	<u>53</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>50</u>
N =	100%	100%	100%
$\chi^2 = 10.21$	df = 4	Significance $p \leq .05$	

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The findings on this question were surprising. The data reveal that there is a significant difference between the groups, but the Jewish group was not more likely than the others to favor the termination of military aid. The Catholics had the largest percentage in this category with 53 percent, compared to 41 percent of the Episcopalians and 50 percent of the Jews. These responses would give an indication that the perceptual component of an image of the Middle East might be negative towards the Arab states. It may also be that the majority of Americans do not wish to become directly involved in another conflict situation such as Vietnam. They could view the termination of military assistance as one way to do this.

Again the Jewish group had the lowest percentage (15 percent) in the undecided category, while the Episcopalians and the Catholics had 32 and 29 percent respectively. This may be yet another indication that Jewish religious ties might influence these people so that they are more concerned and have a more definite opinion on matters concerning the Middle East. Of those respondents who disagreed with the termination of military aid to Jordan, 18 percent were Catholic, 27 percent were Episcopalian, and 35 percent were Jewish. One reason for the larger number of Jewish respondents in this category might be that they feel Jordan, because of its apparent "moderate" stance, may become somewhat of an ally in the future for Israel. In any case, the basic assumption was partially supported, for there was a significant difference between the groups, but the Jewish group was not more likely to agree with the termination



of military assistance to Jordan.

The final item of the single indicators of a person's action oriented images asked the respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the United States should engage in more dialogue with the Arab states. Aside from the expectation that there would be a significant difference between the three groups, it was also expected that the Jewish group would be more likely to disagree with this policy for fear that it would endanger the existing United States ties to Israel. The results are shown in Table 2-4 below.

TABLE 2-4: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND U.S. ENGAGING IN MORE DIALOGUE WITH THE ARAB STATES

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Disagree	17%	13%	20%
Undecided	12	16	23
Agree	<u>71</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>57</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(76)	(76)	(80)
$\chi^2 = 5.24$ $df = 4$ Not significant			

The data show that the Jews do appear more likely to disagree with the engaging of more dialogue with the Arab states. Twenty percent of the Jewish group was found to disagree with more dialogue as compared to 17 percent of the Catholics and 13 percent of the Episcopalians. The difference, however, was not statistically

significant. The majority of all respondents agreed with more dialogue with the Arabs. One reason for this might be that they see increased dialogue as a means to better international co-operation and that such dialogue has great utility. Seventy-one percent of the Episcopalians and Catholics were found to agree, while the Jews had a lower percentage of 54. The larger percentage of Jews in the undecided category might indicate that Jewish people, in this instance, are somewhat torn between a desire for greater co-operation and their religious ties to Israel.

This was the concluding item of the single question indicators of action oriented images of the Middle East. In short, the Jewish group was found to more likely take a stance in their action orientation that favored Israel than were the other two groups. The differences, however, were not always statistically significant. The next indicator of the action component of Middle East images will be a future assistance to Israel scale.

#### Future Assistance to Israel Scale

The future assistance to Israel scale was formed from a series of four statements about the various foreign policies the United States should follow in regard to the Middle East. The respondents were asked whether they agreed, disagreed or were undecided as far as the following statements were concerned: (1) The United States should sell arms to Israel in an effort to maintain a reasonable military balance in the Middle East; (2) American troops should be sent to protect Israel if it appears that the Arab states

will achieve a military advantage over Israel; (3) The United States should provide economic aid to the Israelis in an attempt to permit them to determine their own destiny; and finally, (4) If necessary, the United States should provide nuclear weapons to the Israeli government for the latter's defense. The responses to the above four questions were factor analyzed and were found to scale: the factor loadings were .50 or above. The respondents' scores were then summed for the four items. If a respondent did not answer one question, his responses to the other questions were disregarded. Those respondents with a low score were considered to be a low level of assistance respondent, while those found at the opposite end of the scale were considered to be a high level of assistance respondent. A moderate category was also included for those respondents with scores in the middle categories. It was expected that there would be a significant difference between the religious groups and that the Jewish group would more likely be "hawkish" than the other two groups.

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TABLE 2-5: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL SCALE

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Low Level	51%	34%	6%
Moderate	32	54	28
High Level	<u>17</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>66</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(71)	(76)	(81)
$\chi^2 = 76.42$	df = 4	Significance $p \leq .001$	

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The data presented in Table 2-5 confirm the expectation of a significant difference between the groups. Only 6 percent of the Jewish group was found in the low level of assistance category, compared to 51 percent of the Catholics and 34 percent of the Episcopalians. In the moderate category the Episcopalians had the largest percentage with 54 while the Catholics had 32 percent and the Jews had 28 percent in this category. The majority of the Jewish group was found in the high level of assistance classification with 66 percent. The Catholics and Episcopalians had 17 and 12 percent respectively. From the findings, then, the Catholics are the least willing of the three groups to give aid and military assistance to Israel. The Episcopalians, although not quite as "dovish" as the Catholics, are not near as willing as the Jewish group to give the various types of aid. These findings again uphold Hero's conclusions that Catholics are less willing to make hardline commitments than Protestants. The reluctance of the Catholics and Episcopalians to strongly favor the commitments is perhaps due to the feeling that they could pull the United States into what could become a "Vietnam" in the Middle East. The majority of the Jewish group in the high level category indicates that the influence of Jewish religious ties is very strong. The findings from this table thus confirmed the assumptions.

The above discussion was concerned with four policy alternatives summed together to present the general trends as to whether the respondents supported high or low levels of assistance to Israel. The following section will examine the results obtained when the

respondents were asked about the present level of assistance to Israel.

Present Level of Assistance to Israel

In order to ascertain the action component of the respondents' images in respect to the present level of United States assistance to Israel the following two related questions were asked. The first question asked whether the respondent agreed with the present level of United States economic and military support to Israel. Secondly, if the respondents disagreed with the first question, they were asked if they felt the level of support should be increased or decreased. The findings on the first question are expected to show that there are significantly more Jewish respondents in the disagree category when compared to the other two groups.

TABLE 2-6: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND PRESENT LEVEL OF UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO ISRAEL

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Agree	37%	46%	35%
Don't Know	32	34	11
Disagree	<u>31</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>54</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(78)	(77)	(81)
$\chi^2 = 24.51$	df = 4	Significance $p \leq .001$	

The expectation was confirmed by the data present in Table 2-6. There was a far greater percentage of Jews responding in the disagree

category as compared to the others. Fifty-four percent of the Jewish group responded in this manner, while only 31 percent of the Catholics and 21 percent of the Episcopalians did. The difference was much less in the agree category with 46 percent of the Episcopalian respondents, 37 percent of the Catholics and 35 percent of the Jews. Logically, the larger percentage of Catholics and Episcopalians who responded that they "did not know" as compared to the Jews is on account of religious influence. The Jews probably have a better idea of what the present level of United States support to Israel is because their religious ties to Israel have made them more "attentive" as to what was taking place as far as United States policy for Israel is concerned. It is now important to ascertain whether those who disagreed with the present level of support, thought it should be increased or decreased. It is assumed that most of the Jewish respondents will want the level of support increased, while the other two groups will want it decreased. Table 2-7 will show the findings.

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TABLE 2-7: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND WHETHER SUPPORT TO ISRAEL SHOULD BE INCREASED OR DECREASED

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Increased	33%	18%	98%
Decreased	<u>67</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>2</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(24)	(17)	(44)
$\chi^2 = 47.10$	df = 2	Significance $p \leq .001$	

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The data in the table indicate that 98 percent of the Jews who disagreed with the present level of support to Israel wanted the support increased. This is a large and significant difference from the other two groups where the Catholics had 33 percent and the Episcopalians had 18 percent. The majority of the latter two groups indicated they would want to see the level of economic and military support to Israel decreased. The Catholic group showed a majority of 67 percent, while the Episcopalians had a higher percentage of 82. This is somewhat contradictory to Hero's findings that Catholics have a tendency to be more isolationist than Protestants. Again however, Scott's proposition that a well-informed public are found more frequently to have a benign image of the world and more of a desire for international co-operation might be relevant in this case. It could be this desire that has prompted the Catholic and Episcopalian groups to opt for positions that call for decreased aid. Scott's second proposition, that the more contact or exposure one has with an object or group of people the more clear and influenced one's image can become, may also be evident here. The Jewish group has more contacts, direct and indirect, with Israel because of their religion, resulting in a more distinct and influenced image of the Middle East conflict.

Aside from discussing the action oriented images of the three religious groups toward the Middle East, it is also important to determine if the three groups make any attempt to communicate their policy positions which these images represent to public officials. The final section of this chapter will be concerned with the

communication of action oriented images of the Middle East.

#### Communication of Middle East Action Oriented Images

The communication of an image of an international situation could demonstrate that there is a desire to see the situation changed or simply to show approval or disapproval of actions already taken. This is where public opinion might make an impact of foreign policy making. Four methods of communication were studied in regard to the Middle East. The questions to the respondents were: (1) Have you written a letter to the editor of a newspaper on the Middle East? (2) Have you signed or circulated a petition on the Middle East? (3) Have you written to a public official on the Middle East? (4) Have you personally contacted a public official on the Middle East? The respondents were asked to respond "yes" or "no" to the above questions and it was assumed that the Jewish group would be more likely to answer "yew" than the other two groups. The results to the four questions are shown in Table 2-8.



TABLE 2-8: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND COMMUNICATION OF IMAGES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

		CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Written to editor	Yes	0%	1%	13%
	No	$\frac{100}{100\%}$	$\frac{99}{100\%}$	$\frac{87}{100\%}$
	N =	(70)	(70)	(72)
	$X^2 = 14.85$	df = 2	Sig. p $\leq$ .01	
Signed or Circulated a Petition	Yes	5%	10%	60%
	No	$\frac{95}{100\%}$	$\frac{90}{100\%}$	$\frac{40}{100\%}$
	N =	(67)	(67)	(73)
	$X^2 = 68.97$	df = 2	Sig. p $\leq$ .001	
Written to Public Official	Yes	1%	7%	45%
	No	$\frac{99}{100\%}$	$\frac{93}{100\%}$	$\frac{55}{100\%}$
	N =	(69)	(70)	(74)
	$X^2 = 53.13$	df = 2	Sig. p $\leq$ .001	
Personal contact w/ Public Official	Yes	1%	7%	13%
	No	$\frac{99}{100\%}$	$\frac{93}{100\%}$	$\frac{87}{100\%}$
	N =	(70)	(70)	(71)
	$X^2 = 6.75$	df = 2	Sig. p $\leq$ .05	

The data show that usually the majority of all groups have not attempted to communicate their action oriented images of the Middle East conflict. All four questions do indicate, however, that there is a statistically significant difference between the religious groups. In regard to the first question, which asked if the respondent had ever written a letter to the editor of a

newspaper on the subject of the Middle East, it was found that no Catholics, one percent of the Episcopalians, and 13 percent of the Jews responded with a "yes." Although the large majority of all three groups were in the "no" category, the Jewish group had a far larger number than the others who replied they had written a letter to an editor. This again demonstrates the influence the Jewish religion may have on its members.

The next question asked if the respondents had ever signed or circulated a petition on the Middle East. This brought out somewhat more "yes" responses perhaps because the signing of a petition does not usually require as much effort and would not bring quite as much public attention to oneself as would the writing of a letter to the editor of a newspaper. Again the majority of Catholics and Episcopalians were found in the "no" category. Only five percent of the Catholics and ten percent of the Episcopalians answered that they had signed or circulated a petition on the Middle East, while 60 percent of the Jewish group had done so. This was a very significant difference. Perhaps the Jewish group had more access to a petition on the Middle East conflict.

When asked the third question, if they had written to a public official on the Middle East, again a very significant difference was found. One percent of the Catholic, 7 percent of the Episcopalian and 45 percent of the Jewish groups responded that they had. The Jewish group, again, had a far greater number than either of the other groups, thus again demonstrating the influence of religion.

The final question dealing with the communication of images

toward the Middle East, asked if the respondents had personally contacted a public official on the Middle East. The Catholic and Episcopalian group remained about the same with 1 and 7 percent respectively responding with a "yes." The percentage of the Jewish group with this response was down considerably showing only 13 percent. The difference between the three groups was still found to be statistically significant. The smaller percentages could be due to the limited access to personal contact with public officials. In general, the responses to all four of the communication questions do support the assumption that the Jewish group would be more likely to communicate their images on the Middle East than either the Catholic or the Episcopalian groups. From the previous findings, it would be assumed that the Jewish communication would be concerned with increased support for Israel.

This will end the discussion concerned with the relationship of religious affiliation and the action components of images directed towards the Middle East. It was found, generally, that in the single question indicators of one's action orientation, the Jewish respondents tended to be slightly more likely to support Israel than the other two groups. The differences, however, were not always significant. The responses to the policy alternatives in the assistance to Israel scale that the Jewish group was more likely to favor a high level of assistance position, the Catholics a low level of assistance position and the Episcopalians a moderate level. The next questions discussed, those regarding the present level of United States military and economic assistance to Israel, showed that there was a statistically significant difference between

the three groups. The Jewish group was more likely to disagree with the present level of support and felt that economic and military support should be increased, while the others wanted it decreased. Finally, statistically significant differences were found for all questions dealing with the communication of images, with the Jewish group demonstrating a much greater tendency to communicate their images. This was especially true in the cases of signing or circulating a petition and writing to a public official. The conclusion drawn from the findings of this chapter then, is that there was a relationship between religious affiliation and action oriented images of the Middle East.

### CHAPTER III

#### ACTION ORIENTED IMAGES OF VIETNAM

Again, as in the preceding chapter dealing with the Middle East, the basic problem will be to explore the relationship between religious affiliation and the action orientation of images towards Vietnam. In other words, what policies towards Vietnam does the respondent deem appropriate. The secondary research question discussed in this chapter is that of examining the extent to which the respondents have attempted to communicate their action oriented images. It is assumed that in all cases, there will be little difference between the three religious groups. Since the United States was directly involved in Vietnam, in terms of American men, arms and other assistance, and because none of the religious groups have religious ties to either South or North Vietnam, the three groups are expected to have similar images. The indicators used to ascertain the relationship will be similar to those used in the Middle East section. There will be single item indicators, a policy scale, questions dealing with the present level of United States support to South Vietnam and finally, the same questions on communication will determine the amount and manner of communication in regard to the Vietnam conflict. The first of the indicators will be the single attitudinal questions.

### Single Question Indicators

There are three single questions to be examined on the subject of Vietnam. In these questions there was no neutral response and the respondents were asked simply if they approved or disapproved of the following: (1) Getting the United Nations or some neutral country to negotiate a truce with each side holding the territory it now holds; (2) Continuing our present policy of gradually withdrawing troops and letting the South Vietnamese work out their own problems; (3) American negotiations with the Viet Cong if they are willing to make positive efforts towards co-operating. It was assumed that for the first question, the majority of all three groups would approve of getting the United Nations or a neutral country to negotiate a truce and there would not be a significant difference between them. Table 3-1 shows the results.

TABLE 3-1: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND GETTING U.N. OR NEUTRAL COUNTRY TO NEGOTIATE A TRUCE

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Approve	71%	60%	65%
Disapprove	<u>29</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>35</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(72)	(70)	(78)
$\chi^2 = 1.84$ $df = 2$	Not Significant		

The data in the above table support the assumption that the majority of all three groups do approve of getting the United Nations or a neutral country to negotiate a truce and that there

would be no significant difference between the groups. Seventy-one percent of the Catholics, 60 percent of the Episcopalians, and 65 percent of the Jewish group were found to approve, while 29, 40, and 35 percent of the respective groups disapproved of such negotiations. These findings do, however, follow Alfred Hero's conclusions on religious group feelings towards Vietnam. His conclusions were that Jews favored de-escalation and co-operation with international bodies. Catholics, before 1967, were found to be at least as supportive as Protestants of the war, but after 1967, they became more conciliatory than the Protestants and more willing to search for a solution through multi-lateral means. In the case of this study, the Catholics appear to have even a more conciliatory outlook on the situation than the Jewish group. The next single indicator of the action component of Vietnam images does not include the use of international bodies.

The second indicator is concerned with continuing the then present policy of gradually withdrawing our troops and letting the South Vietnamese work out their own problems. Again it was assumed that the majority of each group would approve of this policy and that there would be no significant difference between the three groups.

TABLE 3-2: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Approve	88%	85%	67%
Disapprove	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>33</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(73)	(76)	(79)
$\chi^2 = 12.88$	df = 2	Significance $p \leq .01$	

Table 3-2 shows that although the majority of each group approves of continuing the present policy of gradual withdrawal and letting the South Vietnamese work out their own problems, there is a statistically significant difference between the three groups. The Catholics and Episcopalians have the largest majorities with 88 and 85 percent respectively, supporting withdrawal. The Jews are lower with 67 percent. The percentage of the Jewish group, although lower than the other two, remains about the same as that found approving in the previous question. This might indicate that they are fairly steady in their favoring of de-escalation. An explanation for the larger percentage of Catholics and Episcopalians with an approve response as compared to their percentages in the previous question (71 and 60 percent respectively) might be that they may perceive this method will definitely bring their men home, rather than simply trying to work out a truce. Again, the Catholics had the largest percentage of those approving.

The final single indicator of one's action orientation towards



Vietnam asked the respondents if they approved or disapproved of American negotiations with the Viet Cong if they were willing to make positive efforts towards co-operating. It was assumed that the majority of each group would approve and there would, again, be no significant difference between them. Table 3-3 present the findings.

TABLE 3-3: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH VIET CONG IF WILLING TO CO-OPERATE

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Approve	92%	91%	96%
Disapprove	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>4</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(75)	(78)	(79)
$\chi^2 = 1.84$ $df = 2$	Not Significant		

The above data show that a very large majority of each religious group approved of negotiations with the Viet Cong. The difference between the groups was not significant, as was the case in the first question. The Jewish group had the slightly higher percentage with 96 percent as compared to 92 and 91 percent for the Catholic and Episcopalian groups respectively. This is a much higher percentage of all three groups than was found in the previous two questions. All of the groups must have felt there was a definite need for negotiations. Perhaps they even felt that if the Viet Cong were willing to make positive efforts towards

co-operation, we might be able to "save face." The percentage of Jews, as compared to the previous two questions where their majorities stayed approximately the same, was much higher by about 30 percent. This might indicate that many of them feel there is a great deal to be gained from negotiations. This was the final item of the single indicators. Two out of the three showed there was no significant difference between the religious groups, but in all three questions the majorities approved of the various policies which might put an end to the fighting in Vietnam.

#### Vietnam De-escalation Scale

In order to form the policy scale for Vietnam, questions were asked of the respondents which were taken from the Almond, Verba study. The following five questions were factor analyzed and were found to scale: (1) Do you approve or disapprove of forming a new government in which the Viet Cong took some part? (2) Do you approve of holding free elections in South Vietnam even if the Viet Cong might win? (3) If it means eventual control of South Vietnam by the Viet Cong, do you approve of ending the fighting now? (4) Do you approve of ending United States involvement in South Vietnam even if it means the eventual loss of independence of other nations like Laos and Thailand? (5) If President Nixon were to announce tomorrow that we were going to withdraw completely from Southeast Asia and Vietnam and let the Communists takeover, would you approve? The responses to these questions were then summed. Again, if a respondent did not answer one question, his scores on the others were disregarded. Those

respondents with lower scores, or those who approved of the various options, were taken to be more "dovish," while those in the middle were termed moderate. Those with the higher scores were considered to be more "hawkish." Most of the respondents were expected to fall into the "dovish" category. The results showing the impact of religious affiliation on the Vietnam scale are presented in Table 3-4, although, again, no significant difference between the groups is expected.

TABLE 3-4: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND THE VIETNAM DE-ESCALATION SCALE

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Dovish	32%	39%	47%
Moderate	33	27	30
Hawkish	<u>35</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>23</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(76)	(74)	(79)
$\chi^2 = 5.15$ $df = 4$	Not Significant		

The expectation that there would be no significant difference between the three groups was again confirmed by the statistics. However, the assumption that there would be larger percentages in the dovish category was not confirmed. As the more "dovish," the Jews had the highest percentage with 47 percent of its group falling into this classification as compared to 39 percent of the Episcopalians and 32 percent of the Catholic group. Thirty-three

percent of the Catholics, 27 percent of the Episcopalians and 30 percent of the Jews were found in the moderate ranking. Of those with "hawkish" images, which showed much larger percentages than were expected, the Catholics had the largest percentage with 35, the Episcopalians were next with 34 percent, while the Jewish groups had 23 percent.

The higher than expected percentages in this final category does not necessarily mean these respondents did not wish to withdraw from Vietnam, but perhaps they merely did not want to go as far as approving of some of the consequences such as forming a new government with the Viet Cong or perhaps the loss of independence of Laos or Thailand. The larger percentage of the Jewish group in the "dovish" category might indicate they are more willing to withdraw from Vietnam irregardless of the consequences. These findings support Hero's conclusions that before 1967, the Catholics were somewhat more supportive of the United States in Vietnam than the Protestants, who were, in turn, more supportive than the Jews.

#### Present Level of Assistance to Vietnam

This section will ascertain the respondents' action oriented image of the present level of United States economic and military support in South Vietnam. The first question asked if the respondent agreed or disagreed with the present level of support. The second question asked those who disagreed with the present level, if they felt the level of support should be increased or decreased. These are essentially the same questions that were

discussed in the Middle East section and, thus, should give more of a comparison of images. It was assumed that most of the responses would be in the disagree category and that there would be no significant difference between the groups because of the growth in anti-war sentiment that was present in the United States at that time. The data are presented in Table 3-5.

TABLE 3-5: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND PRESENT LEVEL OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO SOUTH VIETNAM

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Agree	37%	31%	14%
Don't Know	10	14	9
Disagree	<u>53</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>77</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(78)	(77)	(79)
$\chi^2 = 14.27$ $df = 4$ Significance $p \leq .01$			

The assumption that there would not be a significant difference was not upheld by the chi-square statistic. There is, however, a majority of all groups in the disagree category. The greatest difference was seen in the Jewish group. They had a majority of 77 percent disagreeing with the present level of support to South Vietnam compared to 55 percent of the Episcopalians and 53 percent of the Catholics. In the agree category, the Episcopalians and Catholics had percentages of 31 and 37 respectively, while the Jewish group had only 14 percent. It is important to determine whether the Jews who disagreed, feel the level of support

should be increased, as in the case of support to Israel, or decreased. It was assumed that it would be the latter because of Jewish responses favoring withdrawal from Vietnam to previous questions.

TABLE 3-6: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND WHETHER U.S. SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD BE INCREASED OR DECREASED

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Increased	12%	2%	0%
Decreased	<u>88</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>100</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(40)	(42)	(62)
$\chi^2 = 9.98$ $df = 2$ Significance $p \leq .01$			

The data in Table 3-6 indicate that the difference between the three religious groups is again significant. The overwhelming majority of all groups felt the level of support to South Vietnam should be decreased. One hundred percent of the Jews, 98 percent of the Episcopalians and 88 percent of the Catholics were represented in this category. All of the Jews felt the level of support should be decreased, where, in reference to the level of support of Israel, the respondents felt it should be increased. The difference that occurs in this question seemed to lie mainly with the Catholics. More of their group responded in the decreased support category as compared to the other two groups. This accounts for 12 percent of the Catholic respondents, and indicates that they are slightly more willing than the Episcopalians and Jews to

see the present level of support increased. This again follows the pre-1967 trend of Hero's that Catholics would be slightly more willing than the Protestants and Jews to remain in Vietnam.

The three preceding sections were concerned with the action component of the respondents' images of the Vietnam conflict. It will now be important and necessary to determine the extent to which the groups attempted to communicate their ideas and perhaps affect some type of policy change.

#### Communication of Vietnam Images

The questions that were asked in order to determine the extent of communication, were essentially the same as those used for the Middle East. Specifically, they were: (1) Have you written a letter to the editor of a newspaper on Vietnam? (2) Have you signed or circulated a petition on Vietnam? (3) Have you written to a public official on Vietnam? (4) Have you personally contacted a public official on Vietnam? Generally, it was assumed that there would be more people who would have attempted communication than on the Middle East, because it was more of an issue, and that there would be no significant difference between the religious groups. Table 3-7 will present the data on all four of the questions.

TABLE 3-7: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF IMAGES TOWARDS VIETNAM

		CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Written to editor	Yes	6%	6%	6%
	No	$\frac{94}{100\%}$	$\frac{94}{100\%}$	$\frac{94}{100\%}$
		$N_2 = (72)$	$(72)$	$(72)$
	$X^2 = .00$	df = 2	Not Significant	
Signed or circulated a petition	Yes	27%	26%	55%
	No	$\frac{73}{100\%}$	$\frac{74}{100\%}$	$\frac{45}{100\%}$
		$N_2 = (70)$	$(72)$	$(72)$
	$X^2 = 17.11$	df = 2	Significance $p \leq .001$	
Written to public official	Yes	23%	24%	24%
	No	$\frac{77}{100\%}$	$\frac{76}{100\%}$	$\frac{76}{100\%}$
		$N_2 = (73)$	$(72)$	$(71)$
	$X^2 = .008$	df = 2	Not Significant	
Personal contact w/ public official	Yes	3%	12%	11%
	No	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{88}{100\%}$	$\frac{89}{100\%}$
		$N = (71)$	$(73)$	$(71)$
	$X^2 = 4.81$	df = 2	Not Significant	

The data show that although there is a trend toward greater communication than in the case of the Middle East questions, the majority of all groups usually had not attempted to communicate their images to affect a change in the present policy. There was a significant difference in two of the questions, therefore the expectation that there would not be a significant difference was



not completely upheld. The first question, asking if the respondent had written a letter to the editor of a newspaper, showed no difference between the three groups at all. The lowest percentage of "yes" responses was found here. Only 6 percent of each group answered positively. Although the Catholic and Episcopalians had a few more in this category than they did in regard to the Middle East, the percentage of Jews decreased from 13 percent previously. The small percentage of respondents answering "yes" to this question could be due to the wish of many people not to express their opinions so publicly as might be the case of having letters appear in a newspaper.

The next question, which asked if the respondents had ever signed or circulated a petition, showed an increase in the number of people responding that they had done so. The Catholics had 27 percent of its group in this category, while the Episcopalians were almost the same with 26 percent. The Jewish group had a majority answering "yes" with 55 percent. For this question there was a significant difference between the groups. The percentage of Catholics answering "yes" was up 22 percent, the Episcopalians were up 16 percent from their responses to the Middle East question, while the Jewish group dropped 5 percent. The greater numbers are perhaps the result of greater availability of petitions on Vietnam to all three groups and perhaps the security of being only one of many to sign a petition.

Thirdly, the respondents were asked if they had written to a public official on Vietnam. Here again, no significant difference

was found between the three religious groups. Again the majority of all groups was found not to have written to a public official. The percentage of those who had written, increased from the Middle East question in the Catholic and Episcopalian groups. The Catholics jumped from one percent to 23 percent in the Vietnam question and the Episcopalians grew from 7 to 24 percent. The Jewish group dropped from 45 percent in the Middle East question to 24 percent in the Vietnam question.

In the final question, which dealt with personally contacting a public official on Vietnam, the smallest percentage of "yes" responses were expected because relatively few people would have personal access to public officials. It was found that in two of the groups, more people had used this method than writing a letter to the editor and that again, the percentage of positive responses increased slightly from the Middle East question except in the case of the Jews. The percentage of Catholic respondents rose from one to three percent, the Episcopalians rose from seven to 12 percent and the Jews decreased slightly from 13 percent on the Middle East question to 11 percent on the Vietnam question. The difference between the groups was found to not be statistically significant. All four questions showed an increase in the percentage of Catholics and Episcopalians responding positively. The percentage of Jewish respondents dropped slightly, indicating a greater concern or willingness to communicate images on the Middle East rather than Vietnam. Although the majorities were still usually found in the negative categories, the assumption that there

would be more people attempting to communicate their action oriented images of Vietnam rather than the Middle East was thus confirmed for the two Christian groups. Only in two of the four questions was there found to be a statistically significant difference between the three groups.

Overall, the findings of this chapter were not consistent. The responses to the single item indicators were varied. The differences between the three groups were not significant two out of the three times and in all cases the majorities favored methods that would bring an end to the fighting. The Catholics usually had the largest percentage with such responses, the Episcopalians fluctuated and the Jewish group remained fairly constant. In regard to the de-escalation scale, however, it was the Catholic group with the lowest percentage of respondents in the "dovish" category, while the Jews had the largest. A majority of all three groups disagreed with the present level of economic and military assistance to South Vietnam and the overwhelming majority of each group wanted it decreased. The Catholic majority was again the lowest with the Jewish group being the highest. The questions in the communication series showed that there were more respondents willing to communicate on Vietnam than on the Middle East. The next chapter will be concerned with examining the impact of political cynicism on the same relationships discussed in this chapter and the preceding one.

## CHAPTER IV

### IMPACT OF POLITICAL CYNICISM ON IMAGES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND VIETNAM

#### Introduction

This chapter's purpose will be to examine the impact, if any, of political cynicism upon the relationships already established in the previous chapters between religious affiliation groups and action oriented images of the Middle East and Vietnam. In order to do this, it was first necessary to determine the level of cynicism of each of the religious groups. Questions concerning political efficacy and cynicism were factor analyzed and those which loaded above .50 were included as scale items. Questions from both efficacy and cynicism items were found to load together, although most of the items were cynicism indicators. This supports Olsen's notion that cynicism and efficacy are somewhat intertwined. The following indicators were used to form the scale: (1) I believe public officials don't care much what people like me think. (2) These days the government is trying to do too many things, including some activities that I don't think it has the right to do. (3) For the most part, the government serves the interests of a few organized groups, such as business or labor, and isn't very concerned about the needs of people like myself. (4) It seems to me that the government often fails to take necessary action on important matters, even when most people favor such actions.

(5) As the government is now organized and operated, I think it is hopelessly incapable of dealing with all the crucial problems facing the country today. The respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the above statements. A low score, or disagree response, would indicate a low level of cynicism, while a high score would indicate a strong or high feeling of cynicism. Table 4-1 will show the percentage of each religious group at each level.

TABLE 4-1: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND POLITICAL CYNICISM SCALE

	CATH.	EPIS.	JEW
Low Cynicism	46%	58%	43%
High Cynicism	<u>54</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>57</u>
	100%	100%	100%
N =	(76)	(77)	(80)
$\chi^2 = 4.36$ $df = 2$	Not Significant		

The difference between the percentages of the three groups is not statistically significant. Both the Catholic and Jewish groups had a slight majority of their groups with a high level of political cynicism. The Jews had the highest percentage with 57 and the Catholics had 54 percent. The Episcopalians had the majority of its group with a low level of cynicism with 58 percent. It will now be necessary to examine the impact of cynicism upon the relationships established in the two previous chapters. Based upon the findings of Hahn, it is expected that there will be some

impact by political cynicism. In the case of the communication questions, it would have logically been assumed that those people with a low level of cynicism would be more likely to communicate than those with a high level of cynicism. An assumption based on Hahn's findings, however, would indicate just the opposite. In other words, those with a high level of cynicism should be more likely to communicate their action oriented images of the Middle East and Vietnam.

#### Impact on Middle East Images

In order to determine the impact of political cynicism on the action oriented image of the groups towards the Middle East, the political cynicism scale was cross-tabulated with the questions concerning the Middle East that were discussed in the previous chapter. These questions will include the single attitudinal questions, the assistance to Israel scale, the present level of support to Israel questions and finally, the series of communication questions.

#### Single Question Indicators

The first relationship to be examined in terms of the impact of political cynicism will be that of religious affiliation and whether the United States should terminate diplomatic contact with the Arab states given Arab policies towards Israel. In the preceeding chapter, it was found that the majority of all three groups was found to disagree with the option, but the Jews had significantly more people in the agree category. The Catholics had the next highest percentage, while the Episcopalians had the smallest percentage agreeing.

TABLE 4-2: RELIGION AND TERMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH ARABS CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Disagree	63%	63%	70%	53%	68%	60%
Undecided	25	17	21	38	15	7
Agree	<u>12</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>33</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	(32)	(41)	(43)	(32)	(34)	(45)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = 1.08$		$\chi^2 = 2.60$		$\chi^2 = 3.2$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	

Table 4-2 indicates that political cynicism had relatively little impact on the previously established relationship, for there was no statistical difference between the two levels of cynicism in each religious group. The majorities, in each instance, still disagree with the termination of diplomatic contact with the Arab states. Of the Catholics, the only difference seemed to be that the less cynical had fewer agreeing with 12 percent, while the more cynical had 20 percent. This indicates that the more cynical were somewhat more intolerant of co-operation by peaceful means. The main difference in the Episcopalian group was that the less cynical had 70 percent who disagreed with the termination of diplomatic contact as compared to 53 percent of the more cynical. The difference was made up in the undecided category. This difference might again indicate that the less cynical would tend to

favor international co-operation by peaceful means and feel this could be accomplished by the continuation of diplomatic contact with the Arabs. The differences seen in the Jewish group also tended to support this conclusion.

The next single attitudinal question to be discussed was concerned with negotiations between the Arab states, Israel, the USSR, and the United States to work out a peaceful solution to the conflict. It was again expected that political cynicism would have some impact upon the already established relationship. The relationship set in the previous chapter showed no significant difference between the three groups, with the majority of all three agreeing with the seeking of negotiations between the various parties. The impact of political cynicism is seen in Table 3-3.

TABLE 4-3: RELIGION AND U.S. NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARABS, ISRAEL, USSR TO WORK OUT SOLUTION CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Disagree	23%	27%	22%	22%	23%	41%
Undecided	12	12	13	22	12	11
Agree	$\frac{65}{100\%}$	$\frac{61}{100\%}$	$\frac{65}{100\%}$	$\frac{56}{100\%}$	$\frac{65}{100\%}$	$\frac{48}{100\%}$
N =	(34)	(41)	(45)	(32)	(34)	(46)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = .12$		$\chi^2 = 1.01$		$\chi^2 = 2.85$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	



Again there was no significant difference between the more and less cynical of each religious group. Cynicism had even less of an impact on the Catholics than it did in the previous question. The less cynical were only slightly more inclined to favor negotiations with 65 percent compared to 61 percent of the more cynical Catholics. In the Episcopalian group, the less cynical had 65 percent who agreed with negotiations, while the more cynical had a lower percentage of 56 who agreed. This indicated that the more cynical were less sure of the value of negotiations as a means to ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Jewish group showed the greatest difference between its two groups, although the difference was not statistically significant. The less cynical group of Jews had 65 percent who agreed and the more cynical had only 48 percent agreed. This was an indication that highly cynical Jews might be more likely to take a more hostile position or one that does not favor negotiations. Although there was no significant impact of political cynicism on the relationships, there was also no support for Hahn's conclusion that the less cynical would favor more aggressive or hostile positions than the more cynical. This would have been indicated by smaller percentages of the less cynical than the more cynical agreeing with negotiations.

The third relationship to be examined in terms of the impact of political cynicism, is that which dealt with whether the United States should not provide further military assistance to the Jordanian government. The relationship between the religious

affiliation groups and the above question was found to be statistically significant. The findings were not the ones that were expected because the Jewish group had the highest percentage of those who disagreed with the termination of military assistance to Jordan and they were followed by the Episcopalians and Catholics.

TABLE 4-4: RELIGION AND TERMINATING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Disagree	18%	17%	32%	19%	35%	35%
Undecided	47	15	35	28	24	9
Agree	<u>35</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>56</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	(34)	(41)	(43)	(32)	(34)	(46)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = 10.46$		$\chi^2 = 3.45$		$\chi^2 = 3.79$	
	$p \leq .01$		N.S.		N.S.	

The data presented in Table 4-4 indicate that only in one instance is the difference between the two cynicism groups significant, and that is in the Catholic group. The main difference was in the undecided and agree categories. Forty-seven percent of the less cynical Catholics were undecided as compared to only 15 percent of the more cynical. Of those respondents who agreed that the United States should not provide military assistance to Jordan, 35 percent had a low level of cynicism while 68 percent

had a high level. Those with a high level of cynicism were much more likely to favor the termination of military assistance which might be interpreted as a more "dovish" attitude. The more cynical of the Episcopalian and Jewish groups showed the same tendency although the differences or impact was not statistically significant. The Episcopalians with a high level of cynicism had 53 percent who agreed compared to 33 percent of the less cynical. The less cynical had 32 percent who disagreed while the more cynical had 19. The two Jewish groups each had 35 percent with a disagree response. The more cynical, again had a larger 56 percent of those who agreed with the termination of military assistance compared to 41 percent of the less cynical. These findings would tend to support Hahn's conclusion that less cynical people favor more aggressive or militaristic positions than more cynical people.

The final single item indicator to be examined for the impact of political cynicism asked whether the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement that the United States should engage in more dialogue with the Arab states. The established relationship with religious affiliation was that, although, the majority of all groups agreed with the position, the Jews had a much smaller one with 57 percent as compared to the other two groups who each had 71 percent. Again it was assumed there would be an impact of cynicism on this relationship. The results are seen in Table 4-5.

TABLE 4-5: RELIGION AND WHETHER THE U.S. SHOULD ENGAGE IN MORE DIALOGUE WITH ARABS CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Disagree	9%	24%	11%	16%	23%	17%
Undecided	15	10	9	25	24	22
Agree	<u>76</u> 100%	<u>66</u> 100%	<u>80</u> 100%	<u>59</u> 100%	<u>53</u> 100%	<u>61</u> 100%
N =	(34)	(41)	(44)	(32)	(34)	(46)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = 3.27$		$\chi^2 = 4.28$		$\chi^2 = .60$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	

Because none of the differences were significant, there was no real impact of political cynicism on the established relationship. The less cynical Catholics had 76 percent of its group agreeing with more dialogue, while the more cynical had 66 percent. The Episcopalians followed the same tendency with 80 percent of the less cynical agreeing compared to 59 percent of the more cynical. The two Jewish groups showed a slightly different tendency. The less cynical Jews had a percentage of 53 agreeing with more dialogue, and the more cynical had a higher percentage of 61. Thus Hahn's conclusion was only supported by the Jewish groups where the less cynical appeared more aggressive.

As far as the four single item indicators were concerned, the general pattern indicates that cynicism does not significantly influence the established relationship between the religious

groups and their action oriented images of the Middle East. There was a slight tendency, however, for the less cynical groups to support solution of the conflict by more peaceful means more than the more cynical. This then, does not support Hahn's conclusion that the reverse should be true.

#### Assistance to Israel Scale

The assistance to Israel scale was the same that was used in the previous Middle East chapter. Simplified, the policy alternatives making up the scale were concerned with whether the United States should sell arms to Israel, whether American troops should be sent to protect Israel, whether the United States should provide economic aid to the Israelis, and finally, whether we should provide nuclear weapons to the Israeli government for their defense. The respondents were ranked according to whether their responses required a high, low, or a moderate level of assistance. In the second chapter, it was found that there was a highly significant difference between the three groups. The Catholics had 51 percent in the low level of assistance group, the Episcopalians had 54 percent as moderates and the Jews had 66 percent in the low level of assistance group. It is expected that there will be no significant impact by cynicism because of the findings witnessed thus far.

TABLE 4-6: RELIGION AND ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL SCALE CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Low Level	53%	50%	18%	55%	3%	7%
Moderate	31	32	66	39	26	30
High Level	<u>16</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>63</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	(32)	(38)	(44)	(31)	(34)	(46)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = .11$		$\chi^2 = 11.14$		$\chi^2 = .77$	
	N.S.		$p \leq .01$		N.S.	

No significant difference was found in two of the religious groups, which in turn, signifies that political cynicism had no real impact upon the relationship of religious affiliation and the assistance to Israel scale. Only in the case of the Episcopalian group was there a significant impact by political cynicism. The less cynical were found to be more moderate and high level than the more cynical. The less cynical had 66 percent as moderates and 16 percent who fell into the high level of assistance category while the more cynical had 39 and six percent respectively. These data then support Hahn's conclusion that the less cynical tend toward more militaristic means of solving a conflict situation.

This same tendency is also found in the Jewish group, although the differences are not significant. The less cynical Jews had

71 percent in the high level of assistance category compared to a lower 63 percent of the more cynical. The Catholics showed even less of an impact, for there were not more than three percentage points difference in any instance. The following section will determine the impact of cynicism on the relationship between the religious affiliation groups and the present level of support questions.

#### Present Level of Assistance to Israel

Again, because of the findings on the impact of cynicism presented thus far, no significant impact was expected on the relationship of the religious groups to the same present level of assistance questions that were discussed in the second chapter. Specifically, the first question asked if the respondent agreed with the present level of United States economic and military support in Israel. Secondly, if the answer to the first was a disagree response, it was asked if they felt the level of support should be increased or decreased. The previous relationship established in regard to the first question, was statistically significant with 31 percent of the Catholics, 21 percent of the Episcopalians and 54 percent of the Jewish group disagreeing with the present level of support to Israel. The Catholics and Episcopalians also had a much larger percentage with a "don't know" response than the Jewish group.

TABLE 4-7: RELIGION AND AGREEMENT WITH PRESENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT TO ISRAEL CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Yes	37%	37%	54%	34%	47%	24%
Don't know	37	26	30	38	9	13
No	$\frac{26}{100\%}$	$\frac{37}{100\%}$	$\frac{16}{100\%}$	$\frac{28}{100\%}$	$\frac{44}{100\%}$	$\frac{63}{100\%}$
N =	(35)	(41)	(44)	(32)	(34)	(46)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = 1.34$		$\chi^2 = 3.30$		$\chi^2 = 4.68$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	

Table 4-7 shows that, again, the differences between the religious groups is not statistically significant. The less cynical of all three groups, however, do show that they are slightly less likely to disagree with the present level of support than the more cynical. The less cynical Catholics had 26 percent who disagreed compared to 37 percent of the more cynical. Of the Episcopalians, the less cynical had 16 percent disagreed, while the more cynical had 28 percent. The less cynical Jews had 44 percent and the more cynical had a much higher percentage of 63 who did not agree with the present level of economic and military support to Israel. It is this response that has the most significance, for these are the respondents who answered the second question.

The next question asked those people if the present level of United States economic and military support to Israel should



be increased or decreased. This would help determine to what extent a "no" response to the previous question was a "dovish" or "hawkish" response. The relationship that was previously established was that 67 percent of the Catholics, and 82 percent of the Episcopalians wanted the level of support to Israel decreased, while 98 percent of the Jewish group wanted the level increased. This was a highly significant difference. The data presented in Table 4-8 will indicate the impact, if any, of political cynicism.

TABLE 4-8: RELIGION AND WHETHER SUPPORT TO ISRAEL SHOULD BE INCREASED AND DECREASED CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Increased	33%	33%	25%	11%	100%	97%
Decreased	$\frac{67}{100\%}$	$\frac{67}{100\%}$	$\frac{75}{100\%}$	$\frac{89}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{3}{100\%}$
N =	( 9)	(15)	( 8)	( 9)	(15)	(29)
df's = 1	$\chi^2 = .20$		$\chi^2 = .45$		$\chi^2 = .11$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	

In no instance was there a statistically significant difference between the more and less cynical groups, indicating there was no real impact of political cynicism. The two Catholic groups had exactly the same percentages, thus showing no impact of cynicism at all. The less cynical Episcopalians were only slightly more willing to see the level of support increased with 25 percent, while the more cynical group had fewer who were so willing with

11 percent. Both of the Jewish groups showed essentially the same relationship that was established in the second chapter. The less cynical Jews had 100 percent in the increased support category and the more cynical group had 97 percent found here. The following section examines the impact of cynicism on the way in which the three groups attempted to communicate their action oriented images of the situation.

#### Communication of Middle East Images

The questions used to indicate the extent to which members of the three groups attempted to communicate or influence policy on the Middle East were the same as in the second chapter. They included the four methods of writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper, signing or circulating a petition, writing to a public official and personally contacting a public official on the Middle East. In general, the previous relationship was that there was a significant difference in each question with the Jewish group demonstrating a much greater tendency to communicate their images than the other two groups. The impact of political cynicism on all four questions is seen in Table 4-9.

TABLE 4-9: RELIGION AND COMMUNICATION OF MIDDLE EAST IMAGES  
CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

		CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
		Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Written to editor	Yes	0%	0%	0%	3%	13%	12%
	No	$\frac{100}{100\%}$	$\frac{100}{100\%}$	$\frac{100}{100\%}$	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{87}{100\%}$	$\frac{88}{100\%}$
	N =	(33)	(36)	(40)	(29)	(31)	(40)
	df's = 1	$\chi^2 = .00$ N.S.		$\chi^2 = .03$ N.S.		$\chi^2 = .09$ N.S.	
Signed or circulated petition	Yes	7%	3%	11%	10%	52%	67%
	No	$\frac{93}{100\%}$	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{89}{100\%}$	$\frac{90}{100\%}$	$\frac{48}{100\%}$	$\frac{33}{100\%}$
	N =	(31)	(35)	(37)	(29)	(29)	(43)
	df's = 1	$\chi^2 = .01$ N.S.		$\chi^2 = .11$ N.S.		$\chi^2 = 1.19$ N.S.	
Written to public official	Yes	3%	0%	8%	7%	48%	43%
	No	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{100}{100\%}$	$\frac{92}{100\%}$	$\frac{93}{100\%}$	$\frac{52}{100\%}$	$\frac{57}{100\%}$
	N =	(33)	(35)	(39)	(30)	(31)	(42)
	df's = 1	$\chi^2 = .001$ N.S.		$\chi^2 = .09$ N.S.		$\chi^2 = .05$ N.S.	
Personal contact w/ public official	Yes	3%	0%	8%	7%	17%	10%
	No	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{100}{100\%}$	$\frac{92}{100\%}$	$\frac{93}{100\%}$	$\frac{83}{100\%}$	$\frac{90}{100\%}$
	N =	(33)	(36)	(40)	(29)	(30)	(40)
	df's = 1	$\chi^2 = .001$ N.S.		$\chi^2 = .14$ N.S.		$\chi^2 = .21$ N.S.	

There was no statistically significant difference found between any of the cynicism level, indicating again there was no real impact. Because of the low number of "yes" responses, the findings may be somewhat exaggerated. It would still be interesting to see if there is any support at all for Hahn's conclusion that the more cynical would be more apt to communicate their images than the less cynical.

When the respondents were asked in the second chapter if they had written a letter to the editor of a newspaper, none of the Catholics, only one percent of the Episcopalians and 13 percent of the Jews responded that they had. The data on the impact of political cynicism showed, of course, no difference in the Catholic groups, but in the Episcopalian group, none of the less cynical group answered "yes" and the more cynical group had three percent who did. The Jewish group showed essentially no difference between the two levels of cynicism. The less cynical group had 13 percent and the more cynical group had 12 percent in the "yes" category.

The question which had the most positive responses was the one concerned with the signing or circulating a petition on the Middle East. The previous relationship was that five percent of the Catholics, 10 percent of the Episcopalians and 60 percent of the Jews had signed or circulated such a petition. There was little impact of political cynicism on this relationship. The greatest difference was seen in the Jewish groups. Fifty-two percent of the less cynical Jews compared to 67 percent of the more cynical responded that they had signed or circulated a petition on the Middle East. This finding supported Hahn's conclusion. However,

in the case of the Episcopalian and Catholic groups, the less cynical had the higher percentage of those signing or circulating a petition. The less cynical Catholics had seven percent and the more cynical had three percent, but in the Episcopalian group, the difference was less with 11 percent for the less cynical and 10 percent of the more cynical.

The third question asked if the respondents had ever written a letter to a public official on the Middle East. It was found in the second chapter, that only one percent of the Catholics, seven percent of the Episcopalians and 45 percent of the Jews had attempted to communicate their images in this manner. There was again, no significant impact of political cynicism on this relationship, although the percentages of the less cynical groups who had written to a public official were larger than those of the more cynical groups. This, then, did not support Hahn's conclusion. All of the Catholics who responded positively were in the less cynical group. The Episcopalians were again very close, with eight percent of the less cynical and seven percent of the more cynical having written. The Jews had 48 percent of the less cynical and 43 percent of the more cynical who had done so.

The final communication question dealt with whether the respondents had ever personally contacted a public official on the Middle East. The established relationship was that the Catholics had one percent of their group who had personally contacted a public official. The Episcopalians had seven percent and the Jews had 13 percent in this category. The data from Table 4-9 on the impact

of political cynicism showed that the less cynical Catholic group again had all of the Catholics who had responded positively. The less cynical Episcopalians had eight percent who had personally contacted a public official, and the more cynical differed only slightly with seven percent. Although it was not significant, the Jewish group showed the greatest impact of political cynicism. The less cynical had 17 percent compared to 10 percent of the more cynical Jews. In general, then, the findings on all four communication questions supported the opposite of the assumption based on Hahn's conclusion that the more cynical would be more likely to communicate their images than the less cynical.

It was found in the Middle East segment of this chapter that, generally, political cynicism had little impact upon the respondents' action oriented images of the Middle East. The single item indicators showed very few statistically significant differences, but there was a tendency for the less cynical groups to have higher percentages agreeing with positions that could lead to a solution of the conflict by more peaceful means. The findings of the assistance to Israel scale showed there was only a significant impact in the case of the Episcopalian group. The less cynical tended more toward moderate and high level of assistance responses. The question on the present level of United States support to Israel also showed no statistically significant impact of cynicism. Of those who disagreed with the present level of support, the less cynical of the Episcopalians and Jews were slightly more likely to want the level increased than were the more cynical. The indicators of

attempts at communication of images showed that there was no definite impact of political cynicism. With these conclusions, it will now be necessary to turn the discussion towards Vietnam in order to determine if political cynicism has a significant impact on action oriented images of Vietnam.

#### Impact of Vietnam Images

Although the conclusions of Harlan Hahn were not specifically drawn from questions concerning the Middle East, they were drawn from questions concerning Vietnam so there may be more support for his conclusions in this segment of the chapter. His conclusion was that less cynical people were more likely to favor aggressive military action in Vietnam and less likely to favor withdrawal than more cynical people.<sup>36</sup> It is therefore assumed that if there is an impact of political cynicism on the respondents' images of Vietnam, the less cynical should tend to favor more militaristic or "hawkish" positions and be less likely to communicate their images than the more cynical. The relationships may be altered however, because of the increased national sentiment for withdrawal since Hahn's study in 1968. The same indicators used in the previous chapter will be used to examine the impact of political cynicism on the established relationships. The indicators include the single attitudinal questions, the Vietnam de-escalation scale, the present level of support to South Vietnam questions,

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<sup>36</sup>Hahn, "Political Efficacy," pp. 275-6.

and the series of communication questions. The first to be discussed will be the single item indicators.

### Single Question Indicators

The first, of the series of three, single item to be discussed asked the respondents if they approved or disapproved of getting the United Nations or some neutral country to negotiate a truce with each side holding the territory it then held. The results in the second chapter showed there was no significant difference between the groups with the majority of all groups approving of the policy option. It was expected that there would not be a statistically significant impact of cynicism on this relationship, but there might be a greater tendency for the less cynical groups to disapprove of such a policy than the other two groups. Table 4-10 presents the findings.

TABLE 4-10: RELIGION AND GETTING U.N. OR NEUTRAL COUNTRY TO NEGOTIATE TRUCE CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Approve	76%	68%	55%	67%	58%	73%
Disapprove	$\frac{24}{100\%}$	$\frac{32}{100\%}$	$\frac{45}{100\%}$	$\frac{33}{100\%}$	$\frac{42}{100\%}$	$\frac{27}{100\%}$
N =	(33)	(37)	(40)	(30)	(33)	(44)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = 2.4$		$\chi^2 = .54$		$\chi^2 = 1.31$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	



The data in this table indicate there is no statistically significant impact of political cynicism. There was a tendency however, in the Episcopalian and Jewish groups for the less cynical to disapprove of such a negotiated truce. The less cynical Episcopalians had 45 percent who disapproved compared to 33 percent of the more cynical group. The less cynical Jews had 42 percent disapprove, while the more cynical had 27 percent disapprove. The less cynical groups therefore showed a slightly more aggressive position which supports Hahn's conclusion. This tendency was not apparent in the case of the Catholics. Here the more cynical were more likely to disapprove of getting the United Nations or a neutral country to negotiate a truce with 32 percent compared to 24 percent of the less cynical. The less cynical Catholics might not have what Hahn terms, the "enhanced confidence in the ability of the country to achieve its military objectives in Vietnam."<sup>37</sup>

The second of the single questions asked if the respondents approved or disapproved of gradually withdrawing troops and letting the South Vietnamese work out their own problems. In the preceding chapter, it was found that there was a significant difference between the religious groups. The Jewish group was more likely to disapprove with 33 percent than the Episcopalians and the Catholics who had 15 and 12 percent respectively. It was assumed that there would be no impact of political cynicism because of previous findings.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 276.

TABLE 4-11: RELIGION AND GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Approve	85%	92%	89%	81%	79%	59%
Disapprove	$\frac{15}{100\%}$	$\frac{8}{100\%}$	$\frac{11}{100\%}$	$\frac{19}{100\%}$	$\frac{21}{100\%}$	$\frac{41}{100\%}$
N =	(34)	(37)	(44)	(32)	(34)	(44)
df's = 1	$\chi^2 = .25$		$\chi^2 = .32$		$\chi^2 = 2.76$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	

The data in Table 4-11 indicate there was no significant difference between the cynicism groups. The tendency for the less cynical groups to favor a more militaristic position than the high level groups was seen only slightly in the Catholic group. Here, 15 percent of the less cynical Catholics disapproved of withdrawing as compared to 8 percent of the more cynical group. The Episcopalian and Jewish groups did not show the tendency they displayed in the first of the single questions. In this question, the two groups showed that if political cynicism did have an impact on the relationship, it was that the more cynical groups were more likely to favor a militaristic position than the less cynical groups. The more cynical Episcopalians had 19 percent disapprove and the less cynical had 11 percent. In the case of the Jewish groups, the difference was much greater with 41 percent of the more cynical group disapproving while the less cynical group had

21 percent. There was no significant impact of political cynicism, and not even the tendencies supported Hahn's conclusions.

The third and final question of this series dealt with whether the respondents favored American negotiations with the Viet Cong if they were willing to make positive efforts towards co-operating. The previously established relationship between the religious affiliation groups and their stance on this question was not statistically significant with only eight percent of the Catholics, nine percent of the Episcopalians and four percent of the Jews not favoring such negotiations with the Viet Cong. Again, no significant impact was expected.

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TABLE 4-12: RELIGION AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VIET CONG CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Favor	100%	90%	93%	88%	94%	98%
Do not favor	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{10}{100\%}$	$\frac{7}{100\%}$	$\frac{12}{100\%}$	$\frac{6}{100\%}$	$\frac{2}{100\%}$
N =	(35)	(38)	(45)	(32)	(33)	(46)
df's = 1	$\chi^2 = 2.13$		$\chi^2 = 2.35$		$\chi^2 = .08$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	

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The data in Table 4-12 support the assumption that there would be no statistically significant impact of political cynicism on the established relationship. The greatest difference was seen in the case of the two Catholic groups where all of those responding that

they did not favor negotiations with the Viet Cong were in the more cynical group. The less cynical Episcopalians had seven percent and the more cynical had 12 percent who did not favor negotiations. The Jewish group showed even less of a difference, with the less cynical having six percent in this category, while the more cynical had only two percent.

None of the relationships between religious affiliation and the single attitudinal questions showed a significant impact by political cynicism. The findings were varied so there was no consistent trend as to which cynicism group would be more likely to take a more militaristic or aggressive position. Thus, there was no strong support for any of Hahn's conclusions.

#### Vietnam De-escalation Scale

The de-escalation scale, as in the second chapter, contained the items calling for approval or disapproval of forming a new government in which the Viet Cong took some part: holding free elections in South Vietnam even if the Viet Cong might win; of ending the fighting now even if it means the eventual control of South Vietnam by the Viet Cong; of ending United States involvement in South Vietnam even if it means the eventual loss of independence of other nations; and finally of withdrawing completely and letting the Communists take over. Previously it was found that the differences between the religious groups were not significant. The Catholics respectively had 32, 33 and 35 percent with "dove," moderate and "hawk," scores; the Episcopalians had 39, 27 and 34

percent respectively; while the Jews had 47, 30 and 23 percent in the three categories. It is assumed that cynicism will have no impact on this relationship. Table 4-13 presents the findings.

TABLE 4-13: RELIGION AND VIETNAM DE-ESCALATION SCALE CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Dovish	29%	36%	26%	55%	32%	58%
Moderate	40	28	29	26	32	29
Hawkish	$\frac{31}{100\%}$	$\frac{36}{100\%}$	$\frac{45}{100\%}$	$\frac{19}{100\%}$	$\frac{36}{100\%}$	$\frac{13}{100\%}$
N =	(35)	(39)	(42)	(31)	(34)	(45)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = 1.17$		$\chi^2 = 7.35$		$\chi^2 = 6.64$	
	N.S.		$p \leq .05$		$p \leq .05$	

The assumption that there would not be a significant impact of political cynicism on the established relationship was not supported by the data on the Episcopalian and Jewish groups. The less cynical Episcopalians had their highest percentage in the "hawkish" category with 45 percent, while the more cynical had their highest percentage of 55 in the "dovish" category. The tendency was the same in the Jewish group. The less cynical Jews had slightly more with "hawkish" scores with 36 percent compared to 13 percent of the more cynical. The more cynical were more "dovish" with 58 percent of its group represented here. The Episcopalian and Jewish groups do lend support to Hahn's conclusion

that less cynical people should tend to support more militaristic policy options. Cynicism, thus, has a definite impact on the relationship of these two religious groups to the Vietnam de-escalation scale. This was not true in the case of the Catholic group. There was no significant impact of cynicism and the tendency was that the less cynical would be more moderate, while the more cynical would tend to be either more "dovish" or "hawkish" than the less cynical.

#### Present Level of Assistance to Vietnam

This section is concerned with the impact of political cynicism on the relationship of religious affiliation and the two questions dealing with the present level of assistance to South Vietnam. Specifically, the first question asked the respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the present level of United States economic and military support to South Vietnam. In the preceding chapter it was found that 53 percent of the Catholics, 55 percent of the Episcopalians, and 77 percent of the Jews disagreed with the present level of support. It was again assumed that there would be no significant impact of political cynicism. The findings are reported in Table 4-14.

TABLE 4-14: RELIGION AND PRESENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT TO SOUTH VIETNAM CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Agree	40%	32%	48%	10%	24%	7%
Don't Know	14	7	16	9	12	6
Disagree	$\frac{45}{100\%}$	$\frac{61}{100\%}$	$\frac{36}{100\%}$	$\frac{81}{100\%}$	$\frac{64}{100\%}$	$\frac{87}{100\%}$
N =	(35)	(41)	(44)	(32)	(33)	(45)
df's = 2	$\chi^2 = 2.05$		$\chi^2 = 15.98$		$\chi^2 = 6.11$	
	N.S.		$p \leq .001$		0 .05	

The assumption that there would not be a significant difference was again disproved in two of the three religious groups; indicating an impact of political cynicism. The same tendency for those respondents with a low level of cynicism to be more inclined to agree with the present level of support to Vietnam, was seen in all three groups. Although the difference was not significant, the less cynical Catholic had 45 percent who disagreed with the present level of support to South Vietnam, while the more cynical had a higher 61 percent. The difference was greatest in the Episcopalian group. The less cynical had 36 percent who disagreed compared to 81 percent of the more cynical Episcopalians. The difference between the two cynicism levels of the Jewish group was also statistically significant, with 64 percent of the less cynical and 87 percent of the more cynical disagreeing with the present level

of support. It will now be important to examine the responses to the next question by those who disagreed.

The respondents who disagreed with the present level of support were asked if the level should be increased or decreased. The results in the preceding chapter showed that all three groups were overwhelmingly in favor of decreased support. There was a significant difference in that none of the Jewish group, 12 percent of the Catholics and two percent of the Episcopalians wanted the level of support increased. No significant impact of political cynicism on this relationship is expected, but there might be a tendency for those respondents with a high level of cynicism to favor decreased support more than those with a low level of cynicism.

TABLE 4-15: RELIGION AND INCREASED OR DECREASED SUPPORT TO SOUTH VIETNAM CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

	CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Increased	20%	8%	0%	4%	0%	0%
Decreased	$\frac{80}{100\%}$	$\frac{92}{100\%}$	$\frac{100}{100\%}$	$\frac{96}{100\%}$	$\frac{100}{100\%}$	$\frac{100}{100\%}$
N =	(15)	(25)	(16)	(26)	(21)	(40)
df's = 1	$\chi^2 = .38$		$\chi^2 = .06$		$\chi^2 = .00$	
	N.S.		N.S.		N.S.	

The data in Table 4-15 support the assumption that there would be no significant difference or impact of political cynicism on the established relationships. Only in the case of the two Catholic



groups was the predicted tendency apparent. The less cynical group had a higher percentage of 20 as compared to eight percent of the more cynical group who wanted the present level of support to South Vietnam increased. This indicates the more cynical were more likely to see the level decreased as was predicted. This was not true in the Episcopalian and Jewish groups. One hundred percent of both Jewish groups wanted the level of support decreased. The less cynical Episcopalians also had 100 percent in this category, compared to 96 percent of the more cynical group. The examination of these results therefore lends little support to any of Harlan Hahn's conclusions on the impact of political efficacy. The next section of this paper will examine such an impact on the relationship of the religious groups and the series of communication questions on Vietnam.

#### Communication of Vietnam Images

There was very little, if any, impact of political cynicism on the relationship of religious affiliation and the communication series on the Middle East, so it will be necessary to explore the Vietnam series to see if the findings are consistent. The series included writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper, signing or circulating a petition, writing to a public official, or personally contacting a public official on Vietnam. In general, the previous findings showed more people responding positively, with a significant difference in only two of the four questions. The data on the impact of political cynicism are seen in Table 4-16.

TABLE 4-16: RELIGION AND COMMUNICATION OF VIETNAM IMAGES  
CONTROLLING FOR CYNICISM

		CATH.		EPIS.		JEW	
		Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Written to editor	Yes	3%	8%	2%	10%	3%	7%
	No	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{92}{100\%}$	$\frac{98}{100\%}$	$\frac{90}{100\%}$	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{93}{100\%}$
	N =	(33)	(38)	(42)	(29)	(30)	(41)
df's = 1		$X^2 = .13$ N.S.		$X^2 = .82$ N.S.		$X^2 = .04$ N.S.	
Signed or circulated petition	Yes	25%	30%	20%	37%	52%	57%
	No	$\frac{75}{100\%}$	$\frac{70}{100\%}$	$\frac{80}{100\%}$	$\frac{63}{100\%}$	$\frac{48}{100\%}$	$\frac{43}{100\%}$
	N =	(32)	(37)	(41)	(30)	(29)	(42)
df's = 1		$X^2 = .02$ N.S.		$X^2 = 1.79$ N.S.		$X^2 = .04$ N.S.	
Written to public official	Yes	18%	28%	20%	30%	24%	24%
	No	$\frac{82}{100\%}$	$\frac{72}{100\%}$	$\frac{80}{100\%}$	$\frac{70}{100\%}$	$\frac{76}{100\%}$	$\frac{76}{100\%}$
	N =	(33)	(39)	(41)	(30)	(29)	(41)
df's = 1		$X^2 = .51$ N.S.		$X^2 = .54$ N.S.		$X^2 = .06$ N.S.	
Personal contact w/ public official	Yes	3%	3%	10%	17%	10%	13%
	No	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{97}{100\%}$	$\frac{90}{100\%}$	$\frac{83}{100\%}$	$\frac{90}{100\%}$	$\frac{87}{100\%}$
	N =	(33)	(37)	(42)	(30)	(30)	(40)
df's = 1		$X^2 = .41$ N.S.		$X^2 = .29$ N.S.		$X^2 = .002$ N.S.	

None of the statistics on the four questions showed a significant impact of political cynicism upon the previously established relationships. There was a tendency, however, for the more cynical to show a greater percentage than the less cynical, responding that they had attempted to communicate their images. This would tend to support Hahn's conclusion.

The first question, which asked if the respondents had ever written a letter to the editor of a newspaper on Vietnam, originally showed that six percent of all three religious groups had done so. The more and less cynical Catholics had eight and three percent respectively who had written a letter to the editor. Only two percent of the less cynical Episcopalians had done so compared to 10 percent of the more cynical. The Jewish group showed three and seven percent respectively. Hahn's conclusion that the more cynical should be more willing to communicate their images was apparent in all three groups, although the impact was not statistically significant.

Again the most positive responses were in answer to the question if they had ever signed or circulated a petition on Vietnam. In the preceding chapter, it was established that there was a significant difference between the three groups with 27 percent of the Catholics, 26 percent of the Episcopalians, and 55 percent of the Jews responding that they had signed or circulated a petition. When examining for the impact of political cynicism, it was found that there was no significant impact although the same tendency in the results was found that were seen in the previous question.

Again, the more cynical had larger percentages than the low level group responding positively. In the Catholic group, the more cynical had 30 percent compared to 25 percent of the less cynical group, signing or circulating a petition. The Episcopalian groups showed the largest difference with only 20 percent of the low group having done so compared to 37 percent of the high group. Of the Jewish groups, 52 percent of the less cynical and 57 percent of the more cynical had signed or circulated a petition on Vietnam.

The third question asked if the respondents had ever written to a public official on Vietnam. Originally, it was found that there was extremely little difference between the groups with 23 percent of the Catholics, 24 percent of the Episcopalians and Jews responding positively. On the impact of political cynicism, the same tendency of the high or more cynical groups to have higher percentages attempting to communicate their images was seen in two of the three groups. The less cynical Catholics had 18 percent, while the more cynical Catholics had 28 percent who had written to a public official. Twenty percent of the less cynical Episcopalians compared to 30 percent of the more cynical were found here. Both of the Jewish groups had the same 24 percent in this category.

The final question of the series was concerned with whether any of the respondents had ever personally contacted a public official on Vietnam. The previously established relationship of this question to the religious affiliation groups was not statistically significant with only three percent of the Catholics,

12 percent of the Episcopalians and 11 percent of the Jews personally contacting a public official. There was no significant impact of cynicism, but the tendency for the more cynical to be more likely to respond positively was seen in the Episcopalian and Jewish groups. The less cynical Episcopalians had 10 percent compared to 17 percent of the more cynical who had personally contacted a public official. The difference between the Jewish groups was much closer, with 10 percent of the less cynical and 13 percent of the more cynical in this category. There was no difference in the two Catholic groups. The overall tendency for the more cynical respondents to be more likely to attempt communication of their images would remotely support Hahn's conclusion that the more cynical would be somewhat more willing to participate in foreign policy decision making and less willing to leave Vietnam policy to political leaders than were the less cynical.<sup>38</sup>

This will end the discussion of the impact of political cynicism on the action orientation of religious groups images towards the Vietnam situation. In general, it was found that, in terms of the three single attitudinal questions, there was no statistically significant impact of political cynicism on the established relationships. The specific results were varied so there was no definite trend that either the less or more cynical groups followed. The results on the de-escalation scale showed that cynicism had a significant impact on the Episcopalian and Jewish groups but with

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 276.

the same trend of the low level of cynicism groups more likely being "hawkish" than the high groups apparent in all three groups. A significant impact of political cynicism was seen in the same two groups on the question which asked if they agree or disagree with the present level of United States support to South Vietnam. The trend for all three groups showed the less cynical groups more likely to agree with the present level of support than the more cynical group. There was no impact of cynicism on the question as to whether the level of support should be increased or decreased. As far as the communication series was concerned, no significant impact was seen, but a trend for those with high cynicism levels to have larger percentages than the low level groups in the "yes" categories was evident.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The two main problems dealt with in this study were, first to explore the relationship between religious affiliation groups and their action oriented images of the Middle East and Vietnam conflicts and, secondly, to explore the impact of political cynicism on these relationships. It was assumed that there would be a significant difference between the three religious groups in the case of the Middle East because of the religious ties of the Jewish group to Israel. As far as their images regarding the conflict in Vietnam were concerned, it was assumed that there would be little or no significant differences between the three groups because this was a conflict which affected Americans more directly as a whole. Finally, when considering the impact of political cynicism, the assumption was that it would have some impact upon the established relationships because of Hahn's findings on the influence of efficacy.

The findings presented in the second chapter, which was concerned with the relationship of religious affiliation and action oriented images, usually supported the first assumption about images of the Middle East. The findings showed a statistically significant difference in two of the four single item indicators. The differences were significant in those questions dealing with the termination of diplomatic contact with the Arab states and with the termination of

military assistance to the Jordanian government. The next indicator also supported the assumption. The assistance to Israel scale showed a very significant difference and not only by the Jewish group. The Catholics had a majority in the low level of assistance category, the Episcopalians' majority was in the moderate category and the Jews, as was expected, had their majority in the high level category. These tendencies supported Hero's post-1968 findings on the subject of Israel. A majority of Jews were also found to disagree with the present level of support to Israel significantly more so than the other two groups. The overwhelming majority of Jews wanted the level increased while the majority of the other two groups wanted the level decreased. These findings were statistically significant. Overall, the findings supported the assumption that there would be a significant difference in the action oriented images of the Middle East because of the Jewish religious ties to Israel. It was found that the Jewish group was more willing to take positions favoring Israel. The percentages of the other two groups were usually fairly close. Except in the case of the assistance to Israel scale, no definite trend as to which group was more "dovish" could be discerned. It was found that few respondents attempted to communicate their images to public officials. However, the Jews were significantly more likely to have communicated their images than the other two groups.

The third chapter's findings as to the action oriented images of Vietnam, were not all that supportive of the assumption that there would be no significant difference between the religious



groups. There was no significant difference in two of the three single items. Only in the question concerned with the gradual withdrawal of troops was there a difference between the three groups. Here, the Jewish group appeared slightly more likely to disapprove than the other two groups with the Catholics being the least likely to disapprove. A significant difference was also seen in the de-escalation scale, which showed the Jewish to be the most "dovish" and the Catholics as the most "hawkish" of the three. These findings were opposite those found in the case of the Middle East scale. These did not support Hero's findings that the Catholics, since 1967, have become more "dovish" than the Protestants. Significant differences were also seen in the present level of support to South Vietnam questions. The Jews were the most likely to disagree, while the Catholics were the least likely to do so. The overwhelming majority of those who disagreed in all three groups, wanted the level decreased. The Catholics did, however, have significantly more people than the other two groups wanting to see the level increased. The tendency was, then, for the Jewish group to be more "dovish" in their images with the Episcopalians ranking second and the Catholics last. Although again there were no majorities (except for the Jews signing or circulating a petition) of the groups attempting to communicate their images on Vietnam, there were more who did so than in the Middle East. Perhaps this was because each group was directly concerned with the situation. The differences were significant in the case of signing or circulating a petition where the Jews were more inclined to do so, and in the

case of personally contacting a public official where more Episcopalians had done so. Otherwise, the percentages were so close there was no real difference between the groups.

The findings of the third chapter generally supported the assumption that political cynicism, or efficacy, would have no impact on the established relationships between religious affiliation and action oriented images of the Middle East and Vietnam. Specifically, in the Middle East section of the chapter, it was found that of the single items, only in the question concerning the termination of military assistance to the Jordanian government was there a significant impact of political cynicism and it was seen only in the Catholic group. The more cynical were much more in favor of terminating assistance, while the less cynical were far more undecided. In the assistance to Israel scale, again, only one group showed a statistically significant impact. The more cynical Episcopalians were found to tend toward a higher level of assistance response, while those low or less cynical were more moderate in their feelings. The next indicators were those questions dealing with the present level of support to Israel. The only impact was seen on the Jewish group when they were asked if they agreed with the present level. The majority of more cynical Jews disagreed, while those with a low level or less cynical were almost evenly divided between those who agreed and disagreed. There was no impact of cynicism on any of the groups when asked if the level should be increased or decreased. There was also no impact whatsoever upon the relationship of the three groups and their

attempt at communication of their images. In general, then, there was very little impact of political cynicism on the Middle East indicators. There was no definite trend for either of the levels of cynicism to follow a more "dovish" or "hawkish" line.

In the Vietnam section of the chapter, there was some support for the assumption that there would be no significant impact of political cynicism on the Vietnam images. There was no statistically significant impact on any of the religious groups in their responses to the single attitudinal questions. There was a significant impact, however, in the case of the Vietnam de-escalation scale in the Episcopalian and Jewish groups. The more cynical of each group were more likely to rank in the "dovish" category. A significant difference or impact was also seen in the relationship of the Episcopalian and Jewish groups to the question asking if they agreed or disagreed with the present level of support to South Vietnam. The impact was the same on the two groups. In both, the less cynical were more inclined than the more cynical to agree with the present level of support. Of those who disagreed, there was no significant impact of political cynicism on whether they thought the level should be increased or decreased. The findings on the communication indicators also showed no significant impact of cynicism in any instance. Overall, then, as in the findings on the Middle East, political cynicism had little impact on the relationship of action oriented images of Vietnam and religious affiliation.

From the findings presented in this paper, it can be concluded that there was a significant relationship between religious

affiliation and action oriented images of the Middle East and Vietnam situations. The Jewish group was found usually to be more in positions favoring Israel in regard to the Middle East questions and in more "dovish" positions as far as Vietnam was concerned. This supported the findings of previous studies that were discussed in the introductory chapter. The other two groups had specific influence in certain questions, but there was really no overall tendency that supported Hero's finding that, after 1967 and 1968, the Catholics tended to be more "dovish" than Protestants in their stance on policy towards the Middle East and Vietnam. In some cases there was a significant impact of political cynicism of the established relationships, but this was so infrequent that it is felt that there was really no great impact of note. There was even no specific tendency as to how cynicism influenced the images apparent. Thus, there was no support for Hahn's proposition that, in conflict situations, those with a high efficacy level (in this study, a low cynicism level) to favor more militaristic solutions.

Although religious affiliation did appear to exert some influence on the action oriented images of its members, the communication indicators showed there were relatively few attempts made to communicate these images or to influence foreign policy. This is important in order for the images of the religious groups to have any impact on the outcome of policy and thus to have any importance at all in the study of foreign policy. What may come in the future was most aptly stated by Alfred O. Hero:

The churches are likely to continue to exert but very limited influence of foreign policy-making, especially in Congress, until they are able to develop real interest and vitality in this field among at least an articulate, active minority of churchmen and demonstrate some capacity to arouse and sustain considerably greater concern and involvement over extended periods at the local level than are now apparent.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Hero, American Religious Groups, p. 197.

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## APPENDIX



THE UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING  
College of Arts and Sciences  
Laramie, Wyoming 82070

Dear Respondent:

I am a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wyoming. As part of my training in International Relations, I am undertaking a study of foreign policy attitudes of various religious groups from the Denver area. The purpose of the research is to gather information on individual attitudes toward the Vietnam and Middle East conflicts.

This study of these two conflicts will provide information to analyze the impact of age, sex, education, religious affiliation, and political affiliation on particular foreign policy attitudes. From the data, I will write a thesis for my Master's degree.

I invite you to participate in the project by completing the enclosed questionnaire. If you are willing to assist me in this task, please answer the various questions as soon as possible--preferably today, or within two or three days--and return the questionnaire in the self-addressed stamped envelope.

For each questionnaire completed, I will make a donation to the church youth group for their assistance in the project. While it is unusual in survey research projects, you will receive no follow-up letters reminding you to return the questionnaire. However, one of the youth group members may call as a reminder. If you have any questions about the project, please contact Father Christopher.

General instructions for completing the survey are provided in the questionnaire. Most questions require only a check or a circle. You should be able to complete all six pages in less than 25 minutes. If your spouse is also completing a questionnaire, please do not confer with each other--we want your response! The information which you provide will only be used for academic research and will never be associated with you individually. I do want to provide you with a copy of the report, however. You may send me a post card at the University of Wyoming and I will forward a copy of the report to you. Or you may pick up a copy at St. Paul's hopefully by December.

Thank you for your assistance. I hope that you enjoy filling out the questionnaire and that the questions will stimulate your thinking on foreign policy issues during this election year. Thank you again for your contribution to my research.

Sincerely yours,

*Katherine Pershern*

Katherine Pershern  
Graduate Student

*Kenyon N. Griffin*

Kenyon N. Griffin  
Assistant Professor

Department of Political Science  
UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING

Survey of Foreign Policy Attitudes

PERSONAL INFORMATION: WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELF. PLEASE COMPLETE ALL QUESTIONS BY INDICATING (X) BY THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSES.

1. Religious Affiliation

- (1) Roman Catholic  
 (2) Protestant (Please specify denomination) \_\_\_\_\_  
 (3) Jewish (Please specify Orthodox, Reformed, Conservative)  
 (4) Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

2. Age

- (1) 21 or under  
 (2) 22-29  
 (3) 30-39  
 (4) 40-49  
 (5) 50-59  
 (6) 60 or over

3. Sex

- (1) Male  
 (2) Female

4. Educational Background

- (1) High school or less  
 (2) Some college  
 (3) College degree and/or graduate or professional training

5. Occupation (Please be specific) \_\_\_\_\_

6. Please estimate your family income (both husband and wife) for the current year. (You may omit this question if you feel this information is too personal).

- (1) Under \$10,000  
 (2) \$10,000 to \$14,999  
 (3) \$15,000 to \$19,999  
 (4) Over \$20,000

7. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a

- (1) Republican  
 (2) Democrat  
 (3) Independent  
 (4) Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

8. Compared to your acquaintances, how interested are you in reading about and discussing American foreign policy problems generally?

- (1) Generally Disinterested  
 (2) Slightly Interested  
 (3) Quite Interested  
 (4) Very Interested

ELECTION QUESTIONS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

9. For whom did you vote in the 1968 Presidential election?

- (1) Voted for Humphrey  
 (2) Voted for Nixon  
 (3) Voted for Wallace  
 (4) Did Not Vote

10. If the 1972 Presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote?

- (1) Nixon, Definitely  
 (2) Nixon, Probably  
 (3) McGovern, Definitely  
 (4) McGovern, Probably  
 (5) Will Vote for Another Candidate  
 (6) Will Not Vote  
 (7) Undecided

11. The 1972 National Democratic Platform contains a plank outlining strong support for Israel. How will this plank influence your vote for the presidential candidates this year?

- (1) Will influence my vote for Senator McGovern  
 (2) Will Not influence my vote for Senator McGovern  
 (3) Undecided

12. Do you approve or disapprove of President Nixon's handling of the Vietnam and Middle East problems?

- | <u>VIETNAM</u>                          | <u>MIDDLE EAST</u>                      |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (1) Approve    | <input type="checkbox"/> (1) Approve    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (2) Disapprove | <input type="checkbox"/> (2) Disapprove |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (3) No Opinion | <input type="checkbox"/> (3) No Opinion |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (4) Don't Know | <input type="checkbox"/> (4) Don't Know |

13. In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the United States made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?

- (1) Yes                       (2) No                       (3) Undecided

14. In view of the developments since the Six Day War in 1967, do you think it would be a mistake if the United States were to send troops to the Middle East in support of Israel?

- (1) Yes                       (2) No                       (3) Undecided

POLICY ATTITUDES: THE ITEMS BELOW ARE ATTITUDE STATEMENTS EVALUATING YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT DIFFERENT DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. THERE ARE NO "RIGHT" OR "WRONG" ANSWERS. FOR EACH STATEMENT, INDICATE THE POSITION WHICH MOST NEARLY REPRESENTS YOUR OWN VIEW BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.

The responses are designated before each statement by abbreviations of the five choices. The responses and abbreviations are shown below.

SD	D	UND	A	SA
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree

For Example:

- |    |   |     |   |    |     |  |
|----|---|-----|---|----|-----|--|
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 0.  | People who receive questionnaires should conscientiously complete them within three days.  |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 0.  | People who make up questionnaires should be shot.  |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 15. | I believe public officials don't care much what people like me think.  |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 16. | There is no way other than voting that people like me can influence actions of the government.   |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 17. | Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I can't really understand what is going on.   |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 18. | People like me don't have any say about what the government does.  |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 19. | These days the government is trying to do too many things, including some activities that I don't think it has the right to do.  |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 20. | For the most part, the government serves the interests of a few organized groups, such as business or labor, and isn't very concerned about the needs of people like myself. |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 21. | It seems to me that the government often fails to take necessary actions on important matters, even when most people favor such actions.                                     |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 22. | As the government is now organized and operated, I think it is hopelessly incapable of dealing with all the crucial problems facing the country today.                       |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 23. | The United States should terminate diplomatic contact with the Arab states given Arab policies toward Israel.  |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 24. | Continued Israeli occupation of Arab territory acquired in the 1967 War will cause, rather than prevent, another war in the Middle East.                                     |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 25. | Israel should not return any land taken from the Arab states during the Six Day War in 1967.   |
| SD | D | UND | A | SA | 26. | Continuing Jewish migration to Israel necessitates the territorial expansion of Israel.  |

- SD D UND A SA 27. Israel will need to further expand her territory in order to maintain herself as an independent state in the Arab-dominated Middle East.
- SD D UND A SA 28. Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis are blameless for the continuing crisis in the Middle East as both groups have contributed to the conflict there.
- SD D UND A SA 29. Israeli occupation of Arab lands is a primary reason for the recent friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt.
- SD D UND A SA 30. The Israeli government is more obligated than the Arab governments to assist the Arab refugees displaced by Israel since 1948.
- SD D UND A SA 31. The United States should seek negotiations between the Arab states, Israel, the Soviet Union and itself to work out a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israel conflict.
- SD D UND A SA 32. The American people do not understand or appreciate the Arab point of view regarding the Middle East conflict.
- SD D UND A SA 33. The United States should not provide further military assistance to the Jordanian government.
- SD D UND A SA 34. The Egyptian government is currently controlled by Communist-dominated leadership.
- SD D UND A SA 35. American national interests in the Middle East are tied more closely to Israel than to the Arab states.
- SD D UND A SA 36. Proper maintenance of balance of power in the Middle East is the ability of the Israelis to maintain superiority over the Arabs.
- SD D UND A SA 37. Soviet expansion into the Middle East can be contained more effectively by maintaining a strong Israel than by building and strengthening American friendship with Arab governments.
- SD D UND A SA 38. Reports that the Soviet Union is providing defensive weapons to Egypt are propaganda efforts to obscure the growing offensive strength of the Arab states.
- SD D UND A SA 39. Israel needs additional military support from the United States in order to maintain its superior military capability over the Arab states.
- SD D UND A SA 40. The 1967 Israeli air attack on Egypt and Jordan was a pre-emptive attack rather than an aggressive action.
- SD D UND A SA 41. The United States should engage in more dialogue with the Arab states.
- SD D UND A SA 42. United States national interest rests with Israel, but also includes supporting the independence and sovereignty of the Arab states.

- SD D UND A SA 43. Israel presently possesses a clear military superiority over the Arab states.
- SD D UND A SA 44. The Arab states will launch an attack on Israel within the next year.
- SD D UND A SA 45. The United States should sell arms to Israel in an effort to maintain a reasonable military balance in the Middle East.
- SD D UND A SA 46. American troops should be sent to protect Israel if it appears that the Arab states will achieve a military advantage over Israel.
- SD D UND A SA 47. The United States should provide economic aid to the Israelis in an attempt to permit them to determine their own destiny.
- SD D UND A SA 48. If necessary, the United States should provide nuclear weapons to the Israeli government for the latter's defense.

A number of different steps have been proposed to end the present fighting in South Vietnam. Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions to end the fighting? (Please circle the appropriate response).

Approve Disapprove

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 49. Forming a new government in which the Viet Cong took some part.   |
| 1 | 2 | 50. Holding free elections in South Vietnam even if the Viet Cong might win.  |
| 1 | 2 | 51. Getting the United Nations or some neutral country to negotiate a truce, with each side holding the territory it now holds.     |
| 1 | 2 | 52. Continuing our present policy of gradually withdrawing our troops and letting the South Vietnamese work out their own problems. |

For the following questions, please circle the appropriate response.

Yes No

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 53. If it means eventual control of South Vietnam by the Viet Cong, do you approve of ending the fighting now?  |
| 1 | 2 | 54. Do you approve of ending U.S. involvement in South Vietnam even if it means the eventual loss of independence of other nations like Laos and Thailand?                      |
| 1 | 2 | 55. Do you favor American negotiations with the Viet Cong if they are willing to make positive efforts towards cooperating?   |
| 1 | 2 | 56. If President Nixon were to announce tomorrow that we were going to withdraw completely from Vietnam and Southeast Asia and let the Communists take over, would you approve? |